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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIA..'-1 AlJDREivS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
16168

-vsLMiTRENCE MORRIS, as Warden
of the Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant petitioned for a post-conviction writ
of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court to
which respondent moved to dismiss.

The Honorable James

s.

Sawaya granted respondent's motion and dismissed the
petition with prejudice.
DISPOSITION

IN THE LOWER COURT

The Court below heard oral arguments on the
respondent's motion to dismiss and thereafter granted the
motion on November 30, 1978, and also denied appellant's
motion for a stay of execution.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments
and order of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 15, 1974, appellant was found guilty
by a jury of three counts of murder in the first degree
and two counts of aggravated robbery.

The gruesome facts

surrounding the crimes were previously recited to this Court
on appellant's and his co-defendant's direct appeals in
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); and State v.
Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977).

See also the Statement

of Facts in the State of Utah's brief in opposition to
appellant's petition for certiorari in Andrews v. State,
United States Supreme Court No. 77-6743, cert. denied
October 2, 1978, which is part of the record on appeal in
the instant case.
After a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury
determined that appellant's case was a proper case for the
imposition of the death penalty, and appellant was
sentenced to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison.
Appellant and his co-defendant took direct appeals
to the Utah Supreme Court raising constitutional challenges to
their convictions and sentences.

This Court subsequently

affirmed the convictions and sentences in State v. Pierre,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated OCR, may
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supra, and State v. Andrews, supra.

Motions for a rehearing

of the appeals were made by appellant and his co-defendant
without supporting authorities, and these motions were
subsequently denied by this Court.
On or about April 20, 1978, appellant petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari and
the State filed a brief in opposition to his petition.
(These pleadings were made part of the proceedings before
Judge Sawaya and are also part of the record on appeal in
the instant case.)

On October 2, 1978, the petition for

writ of certiorari was denied by the high court.
On or about November 15, 1978, appellart f-1ed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial
District Court, and also applied for a stay of his execution
which was then set for

Dece~er

7, 1978.

Again, he raised

numerous constitutional challenges to his conviction and
sentence.

Significantly, in his petition, appellant also

sought an order from the court granting him authority to
obtain subpoenas in forma pauperis for witnesses and
documents necessary to prove the facts alleged in his
petition and for an additional sixty days after the
completion of any hearing on his petition to brief the
issues of law raised in his petition.

The clear implication

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of these requests is that petitioner had neither ascertained
the facts nor the controlling law to support his legal claims
when he filed his petition despite the fact that he had had
approximately one year to do so from the date his conviction
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.
Accordingly, respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on November 24, 1978, alleging that (1)
petitioner could not, by writ of habeas corpus, raise issues
that were or could have been raised in his direct appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court;

(2) prosecutorial discretion in

charging a capital felony is permissible under recent rulings
of the United States Supreme Court; and (3) all issues
raised by petitioner were addressed in prior pleadings submitted by the State in prior proceedings and adequately
dispose of petitioner's issues on the merits.

(Such pleadings

were annexed to respondent's motion to dismiss.)
On or about November 28, 1978, appellant filed an
amended petition with the Third District Court, again raising
constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence.
Again, petitioner sought an order from the court for adequate
time for briefing, discovery and preparation for any hearing
on his claims and for sufficient authority to obtain subpoenas
in forma pauperis for

witness~s

and documents necessary to

prove the facts alleged in hih petition.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent, forthwith, filed a motion to dismiss
appellant's amended petition on November 29, 1978, reasserting
the arguments raised in the prior motion to dismiss, but
adding additional arguments that certain claims in the amended
petition could be dismissed as a matter of lav7 and others
were frivolous.
Respondent's motion to dismiss and appellant's
application for a stay of execution came on for hearing on
November 30, 1978.

Appellant expressed no objection to the

hearing proceeding on November 30th (Hearing Transcript of
November 30, 1978, at 3, 5).

After full argument, Judge

Sawaya commented from the bench that he hac revie''''=d the
Utah Supreme Court's rulings on appellant's ancL

>,~s

:::o-

defendant's direct appeals, and said, " • • • it seems to me
that it [the cases) covers nearly every issue that could
possibly be raised in a capital case except the one • • •
on the question of whether or not the death sentence is
being imposed in a fair manner."
November 30, 1978, at 32.)

(Hearing Transcript of

However, on that latter issue,

Judge Sawaya commented as follows:
One thing that disturbs me is the fact
that, regardless of our feeling about capital
punishment, it seems that what you [appellants]
are urging is that in any situation where an
individual is convicted and sentenced to death
I guess we should wait over a few years period and
see whether or not there are others that are so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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convicted and sentenced and then if it is
not being imposed on an equal pattern then the
man should have a stay and should have a new
trial or something. I'm not sure I buy that
theory but I'm willing to give it some consideration.
I'm not sure that I have a right to even
voice an opinion about it. The question is
whether or not there is a new issue that should
be considered and the only one that I can see is
the one involving prosecutorial discretion as
it affects the imposition of the death penalty so
I'll consider it and I'll have you a ruling
probably about noon today.
(T.32).
It should be noted that earlier in the hearing, respondent
referred the court to his legal analysis of the issue of
prosecutorial discretion in charging capital offenses
contained at pages six and seven of his memorandum in support
of his motion to dismiss, and argued that the issue was one
that could be disposed of as a matter of law because the
claim had previously been raised to and rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in prior capital cases (T.26).
Later on November 30, 1978, Judge Sawaya issued
a memorandum decision granting respondent's motion to dismiss
and concluding as follows:
It is the opoinion of the Court that the
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
herein raises no issue of fact or law material
to determination of the legality and constitutionality of the conviction, confinement
or sentence of the Petitioner which were not
raised or could not have been raised on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. (R.ll8).
He also signed an order on November 30, 1978, granting
respondent's motion which read as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent's
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is granted on the
ground that all issues raised in petitioner's
petition were known or should have been known
at the time petitioner took his direct appeal
from his conviction to the Utah Supreme Court,
and all issues either were raised or could have
been raised on that appeal, and habeas corpus
may not be used to relitigate appealed issues
or to raise issues which could have been raised
on appeal. Maguire v. Smith, 547 P.2d 697 (Utah
1976); Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 (Utah 1976);
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968
(1968); and Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284,
431 P.2d 121 (1967). Accordingly, petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed
with prejudice, and petitioner's application for
a stay of execution is denied.
(R.ll9-l20).
Finally, on December 4, 1978, Judge SaHaya entered
the following findings of fact and conclusions of

la~:

1. No developments of fact or law material
to the determination of the legality and
constitutionality of the conviction and sentence
of the Petitioner herein have occurred since the
filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court and that Court's decision on that
appeal.
2. All the issues regarding the constitutionality
of the processes for death sentences under Utah law,
the constitutionality of the death sentence in
Petitioner's case, and the effect of any alleged
prejudicial publicity or influences on Petitioner's
trial which are raised or could have been raised
by this Petition are the same issues that Petitioner
raised in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah's death penalty law
is being applied arbitrarily and discrirninatorily fails
to state a claim on which relief could be granted or
on which a hearing need be held. Moreover, petitioner
could and should have raised such issue on direct appeal.
4.
Constitutional issues identical to those raised

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Machine-generated

and decided on direct appeal cannot be raised
again in collateral proceedings.
5. Constitutional challenges to the
pattern of application of a criminal statute
or the excessiveness of a criminal sentence
which were not but could have been raised
on direct appeal cannot be raised through
collateral proceedings.
(R.l24-125).
From the above rulings, appellant now brings this
appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN UTAH IS
PROPERLY LIMITED BY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION TO EXCLUDE ISSUES THAT COULD OR
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL.
A

A STATE MAY FREELY RESTRICT THE
AVAILABILITY OF A POST-CONVICTION
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
In Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946), the
United States Supreme Court examined the requirements of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to
a state prisoner's claim of denial of his right to assistance
of counsel.

The court found that the due process clause

did not impose uniform standards upon the states Wlth respect
to procedural details in their individual systems of criminal
justice.

The Court stated further:
~'lide discretion must be left to the
States for the manner of adjudicating a
claim that a conviction is unconstitutional.
States are free to devise their own systems
of review in criminal cases. A State may
decide whether to have direct appeals in
such cases, and if so under ~trhat circumstances.
. . • In respecting the duty laid upon them
by Mooney v. Holohan, States have a wide
choice of remedies. A State may provide that
the protection of rights granted by the Federal
Constitution be sought through the writ of
habeas corpus or coram nobis.
It may use each
of these ancient writs in its common law scope,
or it may put them to new uses; or it may afford
remedy by a simple motion brought either in the
court of original conviction or at the place of
detention<
So long as the rights under the
0

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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United States Constitution ~ay be pursued,
it is for a State and not for this Court to
define the mode by which they ~ay be
vindicated.
(Citations omitted.)
329

u.s.

at 175-76.

This philosophy was reaffirmed in Young v. Ragen, 337

u.s.

235 (1949), wherein it was emphasized that "Illinois may
choose the procedure it deems appropriate for the vindication
of federal rights."

Id. at 238.

The most revealing statement

of the deference afforded states in fashioning post-conviction
remedies is found in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in Brown v. Allen, 344

u.s.

443 (1953):

The states all allow some appeal from
a judgment of conviction which permits review
of any question of law, state or federal,
raised upon the record. No state is obliged
to furnish multiple remedies for the same
grievance. Most states, and with good reason,
will not suffer a collateral attack such as
habeas corpus to be used as a substitute for
or dupl1cation of the appeal. A state properly
may deny habeas corpus to raise either state or
federal issues that were or could have been
ra1sed on appeal. Such restriction by the
state should be respected by federal courts.
(Emphasis added.)
344 U.S. at 541.
The reference to "issues that were or could have been raised
on appeal" is virtually identical to the language used by this
Court and the lower courts in the Utah cases as discussed

~·

In Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942), an individual convicted of murder sought a writ of coram nobis from
the Supreme Court of Florida which had affirmed his conviction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on direct appeal three years earlier.
Court refused to grant the petition.

The Florida Supreme
The United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether
due process had been denied the petitioner because of the
alleged use of perjured testimony by the prosecution at
trial.

In affirming the denial of the writ, the Court

found that Florida's post-conviction process met the
requirements of due process.

(It is significant to note

that Florida, like Utah in Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, requires that the petitioner assert and show a
"substantial denial" of a claimed constitutional right.)
The United States Supreme Court decried what

~t

·~~~T:~ed

as an "unedifying story in the administration of criminal
justice" and "leaden-footed, dilatory procedure."

The clear

import of the decision in Hysler \>las that the Court would
not questionthe particular details of a state post-conviction
procedure where a remedy, such as coram nobis or habeas corpus,
was sought after an individual had been properly tried,
convicted and denied relief by the highest court of the state
on direct appeal.

Because the collateral attack on the

conviction was instituted some three years after the judgment
was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida was
encouraged to exercise "the vigilance of a hard-headed
consideration of appeals to it for upsetting a conviction."
Id. at 422.
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Respondent submits that just this type of vigilance
has repeatedly and properly been exercised by this Court in
scrutinizing post-conviction petitions for writs of habeas
corpus in Utah.

Vigilance is particuarly appropriate in

the instant case where petitioner has appealed his conviction
unsuccessfully to this Court, petitioned for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court without success, and finally,
some four years after his conviction, sought collateral relief
in state court.
Appellant is candid in admitting that the United
States Supreme Court in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336

(1965),

did not decide that the Fourteenth Amendment required any
particular post-conviction criminal process.

The Court

merely stated that post-conviction remedies were "desirable."
Id. at 346.

Moreover, the Supreme Court continues to remain

steadfast in its position that a state need not even provide
for direct appeal of criminal convictions.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).

Ross v. Moffitt,

The United States Supreme Court's

unwillingness to require states to provide post-conviction
remedies expressed in Case continues to be the dominant
rationale.

The Supreme Court recently stated

"It does not

follow, however, that this Court has the power to compel a
State to employ a collateral post-conviction remedy in
which specific fw1Pr'IJ claims may be raised."

Huffman v.

Florida, No. 77-6025, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1014, 1017
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1978)
supra).

(Stevens, J., dissenting)

(citing Case v. Nebraska,

The concluding paragraph of Justice Brennan's

concurring opinion in Case makes it clear:
[T]here is no occasion in this case
to decide whether due process requires
the States to provide corrective process.
The new statute [the Nebraska statute
providing for post conviction relief]
on its face is plainly an adequate
corrective process. Every consideration
of federalism supports our conclusion to
afford the Nebraska courts the opportunity
to say whether that process is available
for the hearing and determination of
petitioner's claim.
381 U.S. at 347.
Utah also allows an individual to attack his convict:ion by
means of a motion in arrest of judgment (Utah Code Ann. §
77-34-1 (1953), motion for new trial (Utah Code Ann.

§

77-38-l (1953), and the various common law writs of coram
nobis, mandamus and prohibition.

In short, respondent

maintains that Utah has more than adequately provided for
the protection of a prisoner's rights, in the spirit of Case
v. Nebraska, even thoughthe state is not required to do so
by the federal constitution.
It is clear, then, that Utah is free to provide
any system of post-conviction criminal process that it deems
appropriate.

State post-conviction writs of habeas corpus
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are not mandated by the federal Constitution.

Many other

states have adopted a policy in post-conviction habeas
corpus cases that is very similar to Utah's.

A reprcsenta-

tive cross-section of the jurisdictions includes Alabama,
Arizona, California, Maine, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma,
.
Pennsylvan1a
an d Was h'1ngton.

1

Each of these states prevents

a habeas corpus petitioner from raising issues that could
have been raised on appeal.

The support lent to Utah's

position by the adoption of this policy by other states
evidences the viability of Utah's decision to limit the
scope of post-conviction writs of habeas corpus.

Once

a state has chosen to enact provisions entitling a prisoner
to post-conviction relief, as Utah has done with Rule 65B(i),

1

1t

See, e.g., Greer v. State, 49 Ala.Aop. 36, 268 So.2d
502 (1972); Griswold v. Gomes, 111 Ariz. 59, 523 P.2d
590 (1974); In re Black, 59 Cal.Rptr. 429, 428 P.2d
293 (1967); Boyd v. State, 282 A.2d 169 (Maine 1971);
Junior v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 532 P.2d 1037
/
(Nev. 1975); People ex rel. White v. LaVallee, 367 N.Y.S.~
122 (N.Y.A.D. 1975); Young v. State, 451 P.2d 971 (Okla.
I
Cr. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel DeMoss v. Cavell, 423 Pa.
597, 225 A. 2d 673 (1967); Koehn v. Pinnock, 80 \·lash. 2d
338, 494 P.2d 987 (1972).

-14-
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need only apply such a remedy in a fashion that comports with
notions of federal due process.

Respondent maintains that

the following discussion will sustain a finding that this
Court's record in handling post-conviction writs of habeas
corpus does in fact meet the requirements of due process.
B

THIS COURT IS EMPOWERED "liTH DISCRETION
TO LIMIT THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF
RULE 65B(i), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-2-4

(1953), reads:

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by
rules, for all courts of the State of Utah,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings and
motions and the practice and procedure· in all
civil and criminal actions and procceJings,
including rules of evidence therein, and also
divorce, probate and guardianship proceedings.
Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify
the substantive rights of any litigant. Upon
promulgation the Supreme Court shall fix the
date when such rules shall take effect and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith
providing for procedure in courts only shall
be of no further force and effect. Nothing
in this title, anything therein to the contrary
notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal any such rules heretofore
prescribed by the Supreme Court.
In 1969 this Court exercised this rule-making power
by approving Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, providing
for extraordinary writs.

Specifically, Rule 65B(i) (1) states:

(l) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a commitment of any court,
whether such imprisonment be under an original
co~~itment or under a commitment for violation of
probation or parole, who asserts that in any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J

proceedings which resulted in his commitment
tl•ere was a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of the United States
or of the State of Utah, or both, may institute
a proceeding under this Rule.
The authorization of the post-conviction use of the writ of
habeas corpus is consistent with what scholars have concluded
is a valid legislative power to limit, enlarge or amend the
so-called "Great Writ."

See:

Collings, Habeas Corpus for

Convicts--Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40
Calif. L. Rev. 335 (1952); Oakes, Legal History in the High
Court--Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1965). The
authorization in Utah Code Ann.

§

statu~cy

78-2-4 (1953), is, then, a

valid delegation by the legislature to this Court of its
It is respondent's:

power to control the writ of habeas corpus.

I

position that given the power to "prescribe, alter and revise"
the writ of habeas corpus by rules,

2

this Court also

has,~ prio'~

the power to define the scope and application of rule 65B(i).
This Court's power is limited only
in Section 78-2-4 that states:

by the provision

"Such rules may not abridge,

enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant."
Respondent has demonstrated that petitioner has no federal
constitutional right to state habeas corpus relief, thus,
such a claim could not be included in the phrase "substantive
right" as contemplated by Section 78-2-4.

The state

constit~

tion, Art. I, Sec. 5, is an almost verbatim adoption of the
federal suspension clause, Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 2.

The
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2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953).

1

I

suspension clause is directed at suspects, not at convicts.
See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts--Constitutional
Rights or Legislative Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 340-41
(1952).

Any modifidation of the post-conviction writ of

habeas corpus does not run afoul of the suspension clause.
Thus, any limitations imposed by this Court upon the postconviction use of the writ cannot deprive petitioner of a
state constitutional right.

Therefore, as applied to state

post-conviction writs of habeas corpus, Section 78-2-4 prohibits only the abridgement, enlargement or modification of
the state rights of the litigant.

The rights granted

petitioner under Rule 65B(i) are procedural as well as
substantive.

If, in the adjudication of a

clai~

~nder

Rule 65B(i), a petitioner is afforded due process, the state
has met its constitutional and statutory obligations for
determining a state-created right.
Respondent will demonst-rate that due process has been
complied with in the instant case.

Having established that

this Court has the power to control the availability of
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy, it is necessary
to establish that the Utah case law limiting the scope
of Rule 65B(i) is reasonable and in furtherance of a
legitimate state interest.
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c
THIS COURT HAS PROPERLY LIMITED THE
POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
TO ITS COMMON LAW PURPOSES BY ENFORCING
A WAIVER DOCTRINE THAT PROMOTES FINALITY
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.
A revie\-7 of the numerous Utah cases involving
post-conviction writs of habeas corpus reveals that the
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked what is essentially
a waiver doctrine in regard to recognizable claims.

A

petitioner may not raise claims in a post-conviction petition
for writ of habeas corpus that could or should have been
raised on direct appeal.
440 P.2d 968 (1968).

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96,

This standard is imposed whether an

appeal is or is not taken.
431 P.2d 121 (1967)

Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284,

(no appeal taken); Maguire v. Smith,

547 P.2d 697 (Utah 1976)

(appeal taken).

The types of claims

that are permissible on a post-conviction writ are stated
in Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977):
[T]he writ has its purposes, including
the providing of a remedy where it challenges
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgment, or where the sentence imposed is one
not authorized by law, or where it is of an
entirely different character than that which
the statute prescribes, so that a person is
being held under an obviously illegal sentence
and it would thus be unconscionable not to
examine the issue.
560 P.2d at 1109.
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The scope of the writ described in Rammell is
somewhat broader than the common law grounds stated in
Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910):

"Upon habeas

corpus the court examines only the power and authority of
the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions."
Id. at 448.

If a state may restrict the scope of habeas

corpus to its common law limits, a practice approved in
Carter v. Illinois, supra, then it follows that Utah
may permissibly expand the common law limits to the standard
set forth in Rammell.

Respondent would emphasize that Utah

has properly limited the scope of post-conviction habeas
corpus to issues involving (1) the jurisdiction of the trial
court;

(2) the validity of the sentence; or (3) "obvious

illegality."

Rammell, supra at 1109.

The essential

constitutional soundness of Utah's post-conviction writ of
habeas corpus should not be obscured by the extensive
argument in the instant case concerning the waiver doctrine.
An analysis of the habeas waiver doctrine in this
case has been muddled by appellant's interjection of elements
of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

It is necessary to

clear up any confusion by examining the exact nature of the
concepts of waiver, collateral estoppel and res judicata.
Initially, it must be understood that res judicata
has generally been held to be inapplicable in the area of
habeas corpus.

Fay v. Noia, 372 li.S. 391 (1963).

The writ
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lies to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless thut
imprisonment pursuant to them is void, not merely erroneous,
so the application of res judicata would contravene the very
nature of the writ.
Collateral estoppel and waiver are distinguished
in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., at 650:

"Waiver

is voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right,
benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert it."
A party is generally precluded from relitigating an issue
that has been decided adversely to him in a prior proceeding.
In retrospectively examining the rights of a habeas corpus
petitioner, this Court has not found the prisoner estopped
from raising issues that could have been raised on appeal but
were not.

In that case, there has been no adverse decision

on the issue.

Rather, the position of this Court has been

that a petitioner is found to have waived claims that could
have been raised on appeal but were not.

As stated above,

a waiver typically involves an element of intent or knowledge
of the giving up of the right.

This Court has deemed claims

that could have been raised on direct appeal as being within
the knowledge of petitioner, supporting the finding of waiver.
When the state has created the right of direct appeal of a
criminal conviction, it is not unreasonable to enforce a
waiver doctrine with respect to another state-created right,
habeas corpus.

Thus, respondent contends that Utah courts
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that the waiver is being reasonably applied in postconviction cases.
Appellant cites Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), as setting forth the proper guidelines for
determining whether a petitioner has waived issues that
he is attempting to raise in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.

Several cases decided after Fay by the

United States Supreme Court have severely undercut Fay's
"deliberate waiver" doctrine and have left the test of
waived issues in an uncertain state.
The most significant recent habeas corpus case
decided by the United States Supreme Court is
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72

(1977).

Wa~~~right

In Wainwright, petitloner

Sykes was convicted of third degree murder in a Florida
circuit court.

At trial, testimony was admitted that

allegedly violated Sykes' rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384

u.s.

436

(1966).

However, no objection to the evidence

was made at trial, as required by Florida's contemporaneous
objection rule. 3

Sykes ''apparently" did not raise the

Miranda issue on direct appeal of his conviction.
at 75.

433

u.s.

Sykes subsequently filed three unsuccessful post-

conviction petitions in Florida state courts which raised
the Miranda issue for the first time.

3

Florida Rule Crim. Proco 3.190(i), cited in 433 U.S.

Sponsored
the S.J.
71, byn.
5.Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

Sykes then sought habeas corpus relief in federal
district court, where he raised the Miranda issue again.
The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida ruled, inter alia, that Sykes had not lost his
right to raise the issue by failing to object at trial or
on direct appeal.

The court reasoned that only "exceptional

circumstances" of "strategic decisions at trial" would effect
a waiver of issues in later habeas corpus actions.

The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the "deliberate
bypass"rule in Fay v. Noia.

The United States Supreme Court

reversed, citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973),
and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 {1976), as limiting
Fay v. Noia, and concluding that a failure to comply with
procedural requirements would bar the raising of those issues
for the first time on federal habeas corpus absent a showing
of cause for the noncompliance and prejudice resulting from
the state procedural waiver.

The precise definition of the

"cause" and "prejudice" standard was explicitly left open for
future decisions, the court noting:
[o]nly that it is narrower than
standard set forth in dicta in ~Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which would make
federal habeas review generally available to
state convicts absent a knowing and deliberate
waiver of the federal constitutional contention.
It.is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia,
go1ng far beyond the facts of the case eliciting
it, which we today reject.
th~

433 U.S. at 87-88.
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The Court lists its reasons for narrowing the
"deliberate bypass'' standard as including the valid
function of the state procedural requirement itself, the
contribution to finality in criminal litigation, the
prevention of "sand-bagging'' on the part of defense
lawyers and the desire to make the state trial the "main
event."

Id. at 88-90.

Appellant concedes the legitimacy

of the deliberate bypass rule and finality in the criminal
justice system at page 8 of his brief, where he states:
This does not mean that a prisoner may
relitigate through post conviction proceedings
the self same issues decided against him in
his direct appeal, or that criminal defendants
may bypass issues in appealing their convictions
and hold them in reserv~ for post convicticn
proceedings.
While Wainwright deals \11th a federaJ habeas
corpus case, respondent submits that the court's statements
concerning waiver of issues are applicable to the instant
case in particular and Utah

habe~''

corpus proceedings in

general.
Wainwright v. Sykes was applied in the manner urged
by respondent in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied

u.s.

(March 26, 1979).

Petitioner Spenkelink (spelled "Sp1nkellink" by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) failed to raise a claim of
improper jury selection to the FJ.c,rlda Supreme Court on appeal
of
hisby the
1973
conviction
for
firs~provided
degree
jurder.
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was sentenced to death as a result of the conviction.)
Spenkelink's arguments in his petition for federal habeas
corpus relief were largely based upon United States Supreme
Court cases decided after his appeal had been taken, an
obvious similarity to the instant case.

Despite Spenkelink's

arguments, the Fifth Circuit clearly indicated that Wainwright
v. Sykes would seem to preclude the raising of issues waived
in a state proceeding.

(The Florida Supreme Court had held the

claim waived in Spenkelink v. State, 350 So.2d 85

(Fla. 1977).)

The Fifth Circuit proceeded to discuss Spenkelink's claims
as a matter of law, but the citation of Hainwright v. Sykes
is a clear indication of Wainwright's broad applicability,
extending even to a death penalty case.
The state procedural ground at issue in the instant
case is the failure to raise certain issues on direct appeal
from the conviction.

As with the Florida contemporaneous

objection rule in Wainwright, strict adherence to the Utah
habeas corpus waiver doctrine furthers several letitimate
state interests.
(1965).)

(See:

Henrv v. MississipPi, 379 U.S. 443

The refusal to hear issues on habeas corpus petitions

that could or should have been raised on direct appeal
furthers finality in the criminal justice system,

(1)

(2) prevents

"sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers,

(3) serves to

make the direct appeal more of a "main event."

These saP1c'

considerations were persuasive to the Hainwright Court.
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Re~pondent

urges this Court to consider these factors in

addition to the freedom of this state to fashion its own
remedy, argued above, and find Utah's habeas corpus waiver
doctrine a valid policy in furtherance of a legitimate
state interest.
D

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO I!EET
HIS BURDEN OF SHO\VING THfl.T THE
INSTAN'f' PETITION INVOLVES SUCH
UIJFAIRNESS 7HAT IT l·JOULD BE
UNCONSCIONABLE ~JOT TO EXA!HNE
THE CLAH1S RAISED.
In his concurring opinion in l'Tainwright v. Sykes,
supra, Justice White states, "I do agree that it is the
burden of the habeas corpus petitioner to negative deliberate
bypass and explain his failure to object."

Id. at 99.

Extend-

ing this statement to the instant case, respondent submits that
appellant has the burden of showing why relief should be granted
in the instant case.

That is, he must show why the issues

raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus could not
have been raised on appeal.

Appellant has failed to make such

a sho'.·ling.
Appellant raised the following claims in his Third
District Court petition:

(the paragraph numbers refer to the

actual numbers of his petition below which is part of the
record

before this Court).
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llA.

predisposition of jury and failure of trial

judge to grant various motions.
12.

unconstitutionality of death sentence for

various reasons.
12A.

sentencing statute permits arbitrary

and discretionary imposition of death penalty;

inade~uate

guidelines for sentencing authority.
12A(l).

unguided and unfettered discretion in

sentencing authority.
12A(l) (a).

jury in determining sentence needed

no other facts than those brought out in guilt phase.
12A(l) (b).

jury was required to state only one

of two possible sentences.
12A(2).

no requirement of finding or pleading

of aggravating circumstance.
12A(2) (a).

state not required to plead

aggravating circumstance.
12A(2) (h).

no instruction to jury of unanimity.

l2A(2) (c).

jury not

aggravating

circu~stance

12A(3).

re~uired

to specify which

it relied on.

consideration of unspecified aggravating

and mitigating circumstances.
12A(3) (a).

evidence of irrelevant past miscondnct

12A(3)(h).

jury not required to specify its

admitted.

finding on mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstance
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12A{3) (c).

trial court description of alternate

12A(3) (d).

prosecutor's urging of death penalty.

sentences.

12A(4).

absence of standards for balancing

aggravating and mitigating factors.
12A(4) {a).

jury not given standards for

weighing factors.
12A(4) (b).

jury not required to specify weight

given to various factors.
12A(4) (c).

inappropriate burden of proof in

sentencing phase.
12A(4) (d).

jury not informed of burden of proof

it should look for.
12A(5).

no provision for appellate

01.

·"-"'-c

review,
12A{S) {a).

appellate review based only on cases

actually appealed.
12A (5) (b).

failure of this Court to specifically

review findings of aggravating or nitigating circumstances.
12A(5)

(c).

failure of this Court to analyze

presence of passion or prejudice.
12A(S) (d).
12B.

failure of this Court to compare sentences.

arbitrary and discriminatory pattern and

practice of imposition of death penalty since 1973.
12C.

no finding that petitioner personally took any
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120.

purposeless

infliction of pain by h,l.nC)ing or

shooting; infliction of psychological torture.
The petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding
has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he
relies for his release by providing evidence that is
clear and convincing.

McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d

354, 358, 423 P.2d 166, 169 (1967).

Appellant has not

shown any evidence to support the above-enumerated
claims that even approaches a clear and convincing standard.
Because such a showing has not been made,

appella~t

failnd

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Appellant argues that he did not have an opportunity to
present such evidence.

That is not the case.

Judge

Sawaya afforded appellant an opportunity to provide
support for his claims in the hearing on respondent's
motion to dismiss.

Appellant did not make such a showing

and thus failed to meet his burden.

Moreover, each

issue was of such a nature that it could properly be
disposed of as a matter of law.
Judge Henry J. Friendly in his article,
Innocence Irrelevant?
Judgments,

~

Collateral Attack on Criminal

38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 155-156 (1970), has con-

cluded that habeas corpus should not be available upon
a mere open assertion that a "constitutional" right has
been denied.

Of course, non-constitutional claims that
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could have been raised on appeal are clearly waived.
\·7olff v. Rice, 428 U.S. 467

(1976).

Appellant's naked

assertions of "unconscionability" and the "unjustifiable"
conduct of Judge James S. Sawaya in this case are not
substantial enough to merit consideration.
Appellant cites Rammell v. Smith, supra,
(claim of improper sentence), Horne v. Turner, 29 Utah
2d 17 5, 506 P. 2d 1268 (197 3),

(claim of involunta':_!

guilty plea), Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428,
497 P.2d 34

(1972)

(claims of involuntary guilty plea

and ineffective assistance of counsel), Webster v. Jones,
587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978),

(claim of denial of right to

counsel), to indicate the willingness of thi3
entertain exceptional claims.

Cou~~

to

In each o[ the'

cases, this Court held that the waiver doctrine applied
and refused to grant relief in any of the cases.
Contrary to appellant's assertion at page 9 of his brief,
the dicta in the cases concerns the instances in which
the writ will be granted, not the waiver doctrine and the
error of attemDting to use habeas as a substitute for
appeal.
Respondent submits that the claims in the
instant case do not merit consideration in
of habeas corpus.

a writ

If this Court disagrees, it should

proceed to a determination on the merits of the case
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immediately.

A remand of the case is not warranted as

requested by appellant.

Pursuant to the language in

Rammell, supra and other cases, this Court will decide
issues raised in otherwise defective petitions if it so
chooses.

The instant case is one involving protracted

litigation and a high degree of public concern.

The

interests of justice would best be served by a decision
from this Court if it should be

deter~ined

that the

waiver doctrine is not a bar to appellant's claims.
Appellant repeatedly protests that he is being
"forced" into federal court by the operation of Utah's
habeas corpus waiver doctrine.

Respondent submits that

rather than "forcing" petitioners into federal court
for a hearing on their claims, Utah is instead properly
enforcing a waiver ioctrine that is consistent with the
federal trend announced in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra.
The waiver

doctrine also furthers the legitimate

(acknowledged as such by appellant) state interests

in finality and the integrity of the judicial process.
Utah's waiver doctrine will not cause undue friction
with the federal courts (resulting from a federal hearing
on a claim deemed waived by state courts) because
federal courts, following Wainwright, will lend increasing
credence to a state court's enforcement of a procedural
waiver.
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To

sun~arize,

respondent contends that Utah,

as a state, is free to choose whether it will provide
post-conviction habeas corpus relief.

Having chosen to

doso, this Court is properly empowered to limit the
scope of habeas corpus as a remedy in any manner that
it deems is in furtherance of a legitimate state interest.
The method of limitation chosen is a waiver doctrine
that limits the v1rit to virtually its common law scope.
The waiver doctrine is consistent with the trend of
United States Supreme Court case law that stresses
finality in the criminal justice system.

Under the facts

of this case, appellant has failed to show why the Utah
waiver doctrine should not continue to apply and therefore his claim for post-conviction relief shoulJ
denied.
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POIN'r II.
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISSS WAS
PROPERLY GRANTED PURSUANT TO THE DISTRICT
COURT'S AUTHORITY BASED ON RULES OF
PROCEDURE, STATUTES AND CASE LA\•7.
Appellant asserts that post-conviction petitions for
\·nits of habeas

corpus are civil in nature and are governed

by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

He then argues that

motions to dismiss such petitions must be made pursuant to
the appropriate rule, Rule l2(b), and then cites certain
civil cases

(not involving habeas corpus matters) which have

held that Rule l2(b) motions should not be granted when they
raise "matters outside the pleadings."

He states that if

matters outside the pleadings are raised, the motion to
dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment
Rule 56.

~nder

Further, he contends that it is impermissible

for a court to summarily convert the motion into one for
summary judgment without first giving the parties the
opportunity to fully present evidence and contest the
factual allegations on which the motion is based, and that
it is error to require the opposing party to state how he
will establish his claims.

Finally, he asserts that Judge

Sawaya impermissibly granted respondent's motion to dismiss
because in determining that the Utah waiver doctrine
(Point I, supra), barred appellant from

h~beas

corpus reliei,

the court needed, but did not have, the entire record of prior
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proceedings before it.

Additionally, he claims that he

raised certain issues in his petition which were not and could
not have been raised on appeal which were factual in nature,
and thus which could not be disposed of on the pleadings.
Respondent contends that appellant has failed to
recognize the unique natureof habeas corpus proceedings and
the concomitant rules of procedure which govern such actions.
Consequently, appellant's arguments distort the actual mechanics
of Judge Sawaya's granting of the motion to dismiss and attempt
to apply the doctrine of res judicata \vhere it is wholly
inapplicable.

As shown, supra, in Point I, res judicata

is generally conceded to be unavailable in habeas corpus.
Fay v. Noia, supra.

The two principles of habeas corpus

procedure that respondent asserts are applicable arc

(~)

a special, rigid set of rules and burdens of pleading placed
on a petitioner by Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and (2) the waiver doctrine (not res judicata), discussed
supra, in Point I.

A review of appellant's argumen1:s on this

point reveals his confusion.
Initially, appellant's error concerning his
reliance on res judicata is exhibited by the repeated
reference to the doctrine throughout Point I. of his brief.
Appellant states, "A [m) otion cL>iming that one lawsuit should
be dismissed because it is barred by the decision in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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another is not a motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
l2(b) but a matter for summary judgment under Rule 56
since it requires examination of materials and facts beyond
(Emphasis added) .

the pleadings."

Brief of appellant at 12.

The language "barred by the decision in another" clearly
reflects the underlying concepts of the doctrine of res
juC:icata.

As stated in Green, Basic Civil Procedure, Ch. VIII

"Res judicata"

(1972), at p. 203:

"Nevertheless, the

judgment is conclusive, not because there has

been a

merger, but because the judgment establishes a bar to the
plaintiff's suit."

(Emphasis added) .

In the instant case,

Judge Sawaya did not find that appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus was barred from consideration, rather
he found that the petition must be dismissed because appellant
had waived the right to raise the issues that formed the
substance of the petition

without which appellant had failed

to state a claim.
Apart from the basic misconception concerning the
doctrine of res judicata, ap?ellant also misa?plies
certain characteristics of a motion for summary judgment
with what respondent initiated as a motion to dismiss in
Third District Court and what, as evidenced by Judge Sawaya's
ruling, remained a motion to dismiss.

Appellant

quot~s

Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d
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191 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that, "It is error
to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment without giving the adverse party an opportunity
to present pertinent material."
12.

Brief of appellant at

Respondent asserts that appellant was given an opportunity

to "presentpertinentmaterial" by submitting it to the court
in his petition for writ of habeas corpus; indeed, he was
required to do so by Rule 658 (i) (2).

His failure to

support his petition with pertinent material was a basis for
the granting of the motion to dismiss.

Appellant should not

be allowed to demand a subsequent opportunity to present
evidence on a claim that he has failed to state in the first
place.

The court in Soinkellinkv.

(5th Cir. 1978), U.S. cert denied

~\Tainwright,

(March 26,

578 F.2d 590

~; "~·

, also

supports respondent's argument that appellant's opportunity
to present material evidence of his claims was in his petition
by stating, "Fourteen months is sufficient time in which to
assemble evidence for collateral review proceedings."
F.2d 591, n. 11.

578

Apocllant had twelve months in which to

assemble the evidence for his petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the instant case.

(November, 1977 to November,

1978, the date his appeal was decided by this Court to the
date of the filing of his petition in Third District Court).
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Appellant next contends that, "It is error for a
trial court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment or to require the plaintiff to state
'how he will establish his claim

.'",citing several

non-habeas corpus civil cases in support of this argument
(Emphasis added).

Brief of appellant at 12-13.

It is

Rule 65B(i) which requires the petitioner to state how he
will establish his claim in his pleading, not the trial
court.

Because Judge Sawaya determined that appellant's

petition failed to establish a claim, he was merely
enforcing the requirements of

~ule

65B(i) pursuant to

respondent's motion to dismiss, not acting in accordance with
procedure under a motion for summary judgment.

Appellant

concedes that "The kind of dismissal that the District Court
entered in this case is specifically reserved by the rules of
civil procedure for pleadings which on their face fail to
state a cause of action."

Brief of appellant at 14.

Respondent will demonstrate how appellant's petition failed to
state a claim and additional reasons for appellant's error
in arguing that a motion for summary judgment Has issued inste.:td
of a motion to dismiss.
Respondent agrees that-post-conviction habeas corpus
is a civil remedy which is generally governed by

Utah's

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118,

388 P.2d 412, 414

However, it must be recognized that

(1964).
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unlike a regular civil case (where motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment are asserted at the earliest
stage of the proceedings often after only an initial complaint
has been filed commencing the action) , a post-conviction
habeas corpus action commences after

numerous prior court

proceedings have already occurred where the accused has had
prior opportunity to raise constitutional challenges to his
pending or actual incarceration.

There has already been

(1) prior opportunity for pre-trial motions (i.e., suppression
hearings, challenges to the constitutionality of the
statute under which the accused is charged, etc);

(2) a prior

conviction where adjudication of facts and law has been made;
and {3) prior appellate review of the petitioner's case.
Thus, this Court through its rule-making
in Utah Code Ann.

§

78-2-4

ac+:!-cc~ity

(1953), has the

po~er

set forth

to fashion

specialized rules governing post-conviction writs of habeas
corpus.

Moreover, as discussed in Point I., supra, this

Court may, by judicial interpretation, restrict the availability
of any post-conviction habeas corpus rule (e.g., the waiver
doctrine)
This Court has, in fact, enacted a special rule
governing habeas corpus in Rule 65B(i).

That rule, unlike

rules governing the filing of complaints in routine
civil cases, additionally requires that the habeas corpus
complaint (petition) :
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Machine-generated OCR,-37may contain errors.

1.

Assert a substantial denial of constitutionJl

2.

Identify the proceedings in which the complainant

rights;

was convicted;
3.

Set forth in plain and concise terms the

factual data constituting each and every manner in which the
complainant claims that any constitutional rights were
violated;
4.

Have attached thereto affidavits, copies of

records, or other evidence supporting each allegation, or
shall state why the same arc not attached;
5.

State whether the conviction has been reviewed

on appeal, and, if so, identify such appellate proceedings
and state the results thereof;
6.

State whether the legality or constitutionality

of his commitment or confinement has already been adjudged
in a prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding.
Rule 65B(i) (2).
Thus, habeas corpus complaints must be much more
comprehensive than those in regular civil cases.

The

petitioner must explain the grounds for the complaint,
and demonstrate to at least a threshold degree,

th~ir

substance through supporting attachments, etc.

Mere

naked, unsupported allcgutions or legal conclusion:; do not
satisfy this requirement.

Rather, the petition0r l1as a

burden to make an initial showin<J of mf'rit, and mu:;t
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provide the rcviPwing court with certain information so that
a determination may be made by the court 1-1hether the petition
is frivolous, whether issues raised have been previously
adjudicated, or whether
doctrine.

they are excluded by the waiver

Such determinations may even be made before

the respondent is required to file an answer or other
responsive pleading.

Rule 65B (i) (2).

(Also see the Rules

governing federal writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.;
§

2254, 1-1hich provide for such summary dismissal prior to

requiring any pJ.eading by respondent).
Contrary to appellant's assertions, a determination
of the applicability of Utah's waiver doccrine may clearly be
made by the court based on the face of tt!C ha 1:.r, ::c corpus
pleadings without the entire record of an·
before the court.

~·

c.ceedings

Given the comprehensive nature of the habeas

corpus pleadings, the reviewing court may determine
expeditiously that the petitioner appealed his conviction and
raised certain issues on appeal.

(Recall that Rule 65B(i)

(2) requires the petitioner to identify the appellate
proceedings and state the results).

The court may, then,

based upon an objective determination, summarily dismiss any
issues which it sees were previously adjudicated on appeal.
Likewise, a subjective determination may be made whether the
issues now

rrli~c(l

lll

been rctisecl onclire:ct

the complaint could or should have
i.!ppeal, and if so, determine that they

are exclude.',; hy the v;u.ivcr doctrine.

(Point I, supra).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-39-

compl.et<'l~'

In the instant case, appellant failed to
provide the court with the information
65B(i) when he filed his col'lplaint.

re~uired

by Rule

Thus, v1hen respondent

filed his motion to dismiss, he attached copies of the
requisite documents contemplated by Rule 65B(i), to-wit:
copies of prior decisions of the Utah and United

Stat~s

Supreme Courts and briefs filed by the respective
in those actions.

p~rties

These documents clearly provided <tMple

basis for the court to determine that the issues raised in
appellant's complaint either were raised or could have been
raised on direct appeal.

Moreover, appellant was accorded

the opportunity at the hearing on respondent's motion to

dismiss to rebut the applicability of the waiver doctrine
and explain why the issues in his petition were not raised

on appeal.

Obviously, the court found the appellant's

arguments (excuses) unpersuasive.
Appellant asserts that Judge Sawaya must have the
entire record of prior proceedings before him "in order to
make a determination that the raising of an issue is

foreclos~C

by the doctrine of res judicata," citing Parrish v. Luyten City
Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975).

Again, appellant has

confused the doctrine of res judicata with the uniC]ue habeas
corpus doctrine of waiver and thus the case is inapplicL!ble.
Moreover, given the drastic difference between the

~xter•t
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and

scope of the pleadings in habeas corpus as opposed to regular
civil pleadings, the case has little application.

Also, i t

should be noted that in Parrish a summary judgment was
reversed and the matter remanded because ".

[a] survey

of the record (revealed) that the defendant never submitted
a copy of the pleadings and judgment (in the prior decision)
(Emphasis added.)

Parrish, supra, at 1087.

The

clear implication of Parrish is that a determination of res
judicata may be made without an evidentiary hearing when the
court has the pleadings and judgment from the previous
proceeding before it which was the situation in the instant
case.
Finally, it is difficult to see hoe: a ,:,T, of the
complete record of this case, presumably including the 5000
page trial transcript and hundreds of exhibits, would have
had any relevance to a determination of the waiver doctrine
issue.

The only critical question was whether the issues

raised in the habeas corpus complaint were or could have been
raised on appeal.

Judge Sawaya did not have to go beyond the

face of the pleadings in reaching his decision on the waiver
doctrine, and thus could properly rule on respondent's motion
to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary
judgment.

In doing so, he made a determination of the legal

insufficiency of appellant's claims because relief could not
be granted thereon due to the waiver doctrine.
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A party's assertion that 0uestions of fact exist,
may be

dis~issed

by a court if, in reality, the factual

assertions merely color what is essentially a }-e<Jal issue.
Spinkellink v. Wainwri']ht, 578 F.2d 582, 590-591.
~inkellink,

In

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

lvhen, hm·tever, it affirmatively appc0rs
from the petition that a petitioner is not
entitled to the writ, an evidentiary hr-•aJ-in<J
is unnecessary.
. For example, if a netitioner's
habeas corpus allco']ations raise legal questions
only, a district court's refusal to hold an
evidentiary hearing does not violate the directive~
of T01·mscnd (crownsend v. Sain, 372 U.s. 293 (] 963))
or Section 2254(d).
. This rule would also apply
when a trial court holds an inadequate evidentiary
hearing, for if only questions of law arc involved,
an evidentiary hearing to develop fully the facts
underlying a petitioner's co~plaints would be
pointless.
(Citations omitted.)
578 F.2d 590.
Appellant focuses on essentially five issues which he
contends were improperly dismissed by Judge Sawava.

Scrutiny

of these issues reveals that each was either an issue that
could or should have been raised on appeal, or was a legal
issue that could properly be disposed of by Juclqc Saw;aya
without an evidentiary hearing.

The issues discussed here

are raised at pages 13-14 of the Brief of Appellant.
First, appellant contends that Judge Sawaya "(r]cjectr
Appellant's specific allegation that the death pcnaltv was
being imposed on him for reasons not

per~issible

11nder the

Constitution," citing pauc 28 of the transcript of the NovL·~·h·
11, 1978, hearing befor0

JU~'JC

Sawaya.

The io; sues ra i scc1 by
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Mr. Ford, counsel for appellant, at page 28, included the
element of prosecutorial discretion in imposing the death
penalty as well as "[w]e are not limiting our allegations
to prosecutorial discretion but we are looking, as the
Court did in Furman, at the Hhole system."
added.)

(Emphasis

Respondent contends that the court was adequately

informed on the issue of prosecutorial discretion on the
basis of the pleadings.

A discussion of the issue was

included in respondent's memorandum to the court in support
of his motion to dismiss.

As for the "issues" raised in

reference to "the whole system," responden':: main":ains that
this claim is exactly the type of "vague

s~

~ative"

issue which Judge Sm-1aya found unworthy of coJ,.,

~cion.

a~~

Appellant cannot be found to have met the burden of Rule
65B(i), requiring specificity, by simply alleging a legal
conclusion that elements of discretion are improperly present
in "the whole system."

Moreover, the issue of prosecutorial

discretion could have been raised on appeal, as shown by
respondent's memorandum to the lower court tracing the roots
of the argument to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
other earlier cases.

The remaining claims of discretion through-

out the entire system were properly dismissed as a matter of
law as failing to comply with the pleading requirements or
Hulc 65B(i).
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Second, appr"lla.nt a.rgl!es that "[t)hc death pcnCJlly
was being administered 'arbitrarily and discrimina.torily
aga.inst the poor and outcast whose alleged victims are
white'."

This issue is dealt with dispositively in Point V,

infra, and is precisely the type of seemingly factual claim
that can nevertheless be dismissed as a matter of law.

It

wa.s dealt with in just this fashion in Sflink.::_llink, su_r:_r_'l_,
wherein the court stated that such legal issues in

genc~al

could be disposed of without a hearing, 578 F.2d 590, and
that a claim of racial discrimination specifically should
be dismissed as a matter of law.

Id. at 612-Gl6.

Certiorari

was denied by the United States Supreme Court on tl1is issue
and others in Spinkellink on March 26, 1979.
Third, appellant argues that "[t)he jury in his
case was actually a.ffectcd and prejudiced by improper outside
influences."

The essence of this claim is that appellant

is now prepared to show actual jury prejudice because of
alleged improper influence and that he did not and could not
raise this claim on appeal because he did not know he had
to show actual prejudice to prevail on this claim until this
Court rendered its decisions in State v. PiEC_r___F_E?, suo_ra, ancl
State v. Andre1vs, supra

(Trans. ll/30/78 at 9).

The issue of jury prejudice was in fact raised on direct
appeal and respondent at that time clearly argued that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-44-

appellant's burden was to show actual prejudice.

Appellant

failed to rebut that argu!Tient by !Tieans of a reply brief,
oral argu!Tient or petition for rehearing.

The issue clearly

was not a novel one that arose out of this Court's opinion.
Rather, this Court merely accepted the legal argu!Tients
and prior case authorities on this issue which were asserted
by responcle;1t.

Appellant, on direct appeal, clearly could and

should have argued that he was not required to show actual
jury prejudice to prevail, or, in the alternative, assert on
appeal any facts to support a claim of actual jury prejudice.
Thus, this issue was properly dismissed by Judge Sawaya under
the waiver doctrine as being an issue \lhich either \vas raised
or could have been raised on direct appeal.
Fourth, appellant contends that the verdicts of
guilt were not sufficient enough to comply with what appellant argues is a requirement of Lockett v. Ohio, 57 L.Ed.2d
973, 98 S.Ct. 2954

(1978), i.e., that appellant was never found

to have taken life or intended to take life.
dealt ,,.:ith in more detail in Point IV,
respondent argues

infr~,

This argument is
wherein

(l) that appellant's conduct in the instant

case is so distinguishable from defendant Lockett's as to
make the case inapplicable,

(2) appellant atterrtpts to elevate

one statement of a concurring Justice (in disregard of the
central holding of the case) far beyond its meaning, and (3)
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appellant has failed to make the requisite shoHing for
retroactive application of the case.

This issue is legal

in nature, going to the constitutional basis of Utah's
death penalty procedure, and was a proper matter for dismissal
as a matter of law.
Finally, appellant asserts that the court "[r]uled
that substantial claims of constitutional rights violations
were not available to appellant, without determining from any
record whether he had personally waived them or whether his
counsel had in any previous proceeding been afforded the
opportunity to assert them." Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.
This claim combines appellant's claim of the necessity of
a complete record (discussed supra within this Point) and the
standard of waiver (discussed supra in Point I).
concerning the record is an issue of law.

The issue

The issue of the

waiver of claims is resolved by a comparison of the pleadings
in the habeas corpus case with those filed in earlier actions
plus the decisions in prior cases.

As a result, it, too,

could be dismissed as a matter of law.
The above analysis of the five points asserted by
appellant on this issue indicates the soundness of Judge
Savraya' s ruling.

Each one was properly dismissed because it

could have been raised on appeal or because it Has a l:_egal
issue subject to a motion to dismiss.
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As a concluding

argu~ent

on this point, respondent

avers that the district courts of this state have inherent
and statutory power in aid of their jurisdiction to dismiss
sua sponte any matter which, in the sound discretion of the
court, is not an appropriate matter for further consideration.
This would encompass appellant's assertion that Judge Sawaya
improperly reached the merits of certain issues in the petition.
The courts need not rely upon counsel to point out every
impropriety or deficiency in proceedings, but may act upon
its own, with due process, to provide justice.

Such power is

necessary, for example, to increase the productivity and
efficiency of the courts through elimination of matters
lacking a proper case or controversy,

Such elimination is

especially necessary in habeas corpus cases, where significant
numbers of frivolous allegations are brought by prisoners
hoping to escape justice.

Utah Code Ann.

§

78-7-24 (1978),

specifically states:
[W)hen jurisdiction is, by statute, conferred
on a court or judicial officer, -all means necessary
to carry it into effect are also given and, in the
exercise of jurisdiction. [sic)
If the course of
proceeding is not specifically pointed out, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be-adopted which may appear most conformable to the
spirit of the statute or of the iules of procedure.
(Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the judge, in order to satisfy
himself that there was a proper case or controversy before
him, heard at length from appellant concerning what evidence
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he might introduce in support of his allegations.

Appellant

was not able to cite one piece of relevant, material

evid~nce

which he intended to introduce to establish his claims and whid
4
was not subject to rejection as a matter of law.
In the face
of the absence of allegations of relevant evidence to be
presented at a hearing, the court had not only the power, but
the obligation to dismiss the case as a matter of law.
To summarize, respondent submits that the proceducc
employed by Judge Sawaya in this case was properly grounded 1n
Utah rules, statute, and case law.

A motion to dismiss, n0t a

motion for summary judgment, was granted pursuant to valid
authority and based upon adequate information supplied hy the
pleadings and oral

4

argument of counsel.

Concerning allegations 12A, 2, 3, and 4 (of appellant's
amended petition), appellant merely stated that the Utah
Supreme Court had not effectively dealt therewith, and that
appellant wanted to "force" the Utah Supreme Court to ''face
those issues."
(Trans. of 11/30/78 at 15-16).
Concerning allegations 12A, E and F, appellant stated
that they were going to produce evidence of seven cases of
murders as heinous as appellant's where the death pe~alty
was not imposed (T.l7-18).
Such evidence is not relevant
to the issues as a matter of law as discussed infra, Point V.
Concerning the final allegations 12G, H and I, no
evidence was mentioned; only a frivolous argument was
made that there is no bifurcated hearing in Utah on all
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances because
one such circumstance (the one necessary to raise the
crime from second to first degree murder) has already been
heard during the guilt phase of the trial (T.l8-19).
See the virtual absence of mention of any new, relevant
evidence from separate counsel (T.26-29).
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POINT III.
PETITIOi,JER /1AY !lOT BELJEFIT FROM THE
RETRO~CTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW CASE
LAI'l IN f', PETITIOn FOR _1\ COLLATERII.L REMEDY
SOUGHT AFTER A DIRECT APPEAL HAS BEEN
TAKF'l.

Appellant seeks to reap the benefits of case
law that has been announced since his direct appeal was
decided in November, 1977.

Appellant argues that

selected cases should be retroactively applied, citing
Hankerson v. North, Cctrolina, 432
of his contention.

u.s.

233 (1977) in support

The underlyinq rationale of Hankerson

and the very cases cited as controlling authority therein
highlight the crucial distinction that appellant has
failed to make.

That is, cases arising in the

cc~text

of a collateral remedy (habeas corpus) do not profit
from retroactive application of new case law, whereas
cases before an appellate court on direct appeal do
benefit therefrom.
Hankerson v. North Carolina, was before
t~e

Cnited States

Supre~e

Court on direct apneal, the

appellant claiming error in the trial court's failure to
instruct on a theory of self-defense.

Subsequent to

his conviction, yet prior to the decision of the Supreme
Court oE North Carolina on appeal, the case of Mullaney
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v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.

684

(1975), was decided,

givin~

The United States

support to the appellant's claim.

Supreme Court reversed the decision of the North Carolina
Suprer.1e Court and held Hullanev to be retroactive.
Justice Powell, concurring in Hankerson, stressed the
importance of finality in the criminal justice system
and historical limitations on habeas corpus in embracing
the concurrina ooinion of Justice Harlan in Williaus v.
J

"

- - - - - - -

United States, 401 0. ;.

646, 676

(1971).

Justice'

Marshall, also concurring in Hankerson, noted the
distinction bebveen collateral attack and direct review
and also cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Williams as
setting forth the correct position.
In Williams, Justice Harlan distinguishes the
function of the Court on direct review as opposed to
habeas corpus or some other collateral remedy anJ
differentiates between the nature of the two proceedings
themselves.

Justice Harlan concludes that on petitions

fer writs of habeas

cor?~S,

the petitioner may not benefit

f=orn case law that arose after the direct appeal of
petitioner's conviction.
position are
process and

The two exceptions to thi3

(1) matters concerning substantive due
(2) a denial of procedures that are ''implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty."

401 U.S. at 691.
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As an

exa~ple

of the first exception, Justice Harlan

cites Stunley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
second exception, Yick Wo v.

Hopkin~,

(1969).
118 U.S.

For the
3~6

(1885)

Respondent submits that the claims raised by appellant
in the instant case do not even approach the dramatic
reversal of prior case law as involved in Stanlev (First
Amendment private possession of obscene material) or
Yick Wo (landmark equal protection case).

Justice

Harlan's position opposing the retroactive application
of law in habeas corpus cases is clear.
Habeas corpus always has
been a collateral remedy providing
an avenue for upsetting judgments
that have become othenvise final.
It is not designed as a substitute
for direct review.
The interest
in leaving concluded litigation
in a state of repose, that is,
reducing the controversy to a final
judgment not subject to further
judicial revision, may quite
legitimately be found by those
responsible for defining the
scope of the writ to outweigh
in some, many, or most instances
the competing interest in readj~dicating convictions according
to all le~al standards in effect
when a habeas petition is filed.
Indeed, this interest in finality
might well lead to a decision
to exclude completely certain legal
issues, whether or not properly
determined under the law prevailing
at the time of trial, from the
cognizance of courts administering
this collateral rer•edy.
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401

u.s. 682-83.

Numerous other :1abeas corpus cases support 1-h:c nonretroactivity position of Justice Harlan.
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244

See, e.g.,

(l96'o')

speech); Linkletter v. 1"/alker, 381 U.S. 618

(seizure o:':
(1965)

(refusal to retroactively apply Mapp v. Ohio); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278

(1972)

(presence of co'_:nsel at

preliminary hearing); Johnson v. New
719

(1966)

Je~scv,

38~

U.S.

(refusal to retroactively 2'>_"ly lciranda a:1,2

Escobedo).

The reluctance :Jf the United StaL"s Suprcnc

to invoke retroactivity is apparent.
In State v. Belgard, 25 Utah 2d 188, 479
P.2d 343

(1971), the Utah Supreme Court in effect refused

to retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), to a guilty plea by the defendant entered in
1963.

While Belgard involves a retroactivity provision

concerning Miranda (Miranda was expressly made nonretroactive.

384 U.S. at 732), and thus is not directly

on point, respondent submits that this Court is sensitive
to the policy arguments concerning retroactivity, as
evidenced by Belgard and State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah
1977).

In Kelbach, this Court refused to give retroactive

application to a proposed judicial change to the state's
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right to appeal.

The decisions of the Utah Supreme

Court reflect a lir1itation on retroactivity that is
consistent with the position of the United States
Supreme Court expressed in Williams, supra.
Appellant asserts that a defendant cannot
be bound by a waiver of a right resulting from the
acts of his counsel.

Respondent contends that appellant's

assertion is contradic'ce0 by the recent case of I·Jainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)

(Chief Justice Burqer, concurring).

Chief Justice Burger concludes that a defendant is,
indeed, bound by the decisions of his counsel at trial.
See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (l970)
Respondent submits that the same logic applies to
strategic decisions involved in taking an appeal.

Picking

two or three selected issues for appeal as opposed to
the so-called "shotgun" approach is a decision that
counsel, as the person best informed, must make.

,Tust

as a layman cannot be expected to make objections
during the course of a trial, he cannot be expected to
fornulate issues for the appeal of his conviction.
Therefore, the Wainwright rationale concerning matters
waived at trial should be equally applicable in the
instant case concerning the appeal process.
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Respondent avc::rs
Harlan in

lhllie~ms,

the~t

th<e reasoning of ,Justj ce

supra, is souncl.

If finnlity C:icl not

have a legitimate place in the criminal justice

syste~,

retroactivity could be used to extend 9ost conviction
litigation almost indefinitely.
any part of the law

touchin~

Every minor change in

a conviction could be used

as a vehicle to reconsider a co.se time etnd tirne ac;.J..in.

The case law that has arisen since appellant's COIIViction
does not effect a radical change in the prior law.
Certainly appellant has not been denied any procedure
that is implicit in the concept of ordered libertv.
Appellant states that the new constitutional
doctrine that he relies upon "touches the truthfinding function" and is therefore "presumably retroactive".
(Brief of Appellant at 17).

The phrase "truth finding

function" is taken from Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407
U.S.

203

(1972), wherein the Court stated,

Id.

\.There the major purpose of new
constitutional doctrine is to overco~e an aspect of the criminal
trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function and so
raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in
pas~ trials, the new rule has been
giv~n complete retroactive effect.
(Emphasis added)
at 204.
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In citinq this
ewphasizes that

~Clss:tcJP

frorrt Ivan V., the Court

thrcrc~ JCIC:5t

be sub::;tantial

impairr~ent

of

the truth-finding function in order for the retroactivity
doctrine to take effect.

"32 U.S.

at 243.

Appellant has not shown with any specificity
(1) any substantial impairment of the
function or

trut~-findin~

( 2) hovi the ne'.l case: law upon 1-1hich he

places his reliance raises serious

~uestions

about the

accuracy of the guilty verdict in appellant's conviction.
Respondent submits that the failure to make these
showings removes any "presumptive retroactivity" and
in fact indicates that retroactivity is entirely
inappropriate in the instant case.
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POINT IV
THE UTAH DEA'I'H PENALTY STATUTES REMAIN
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND IN LIGH1 OF
RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS.
Respondent submits that appellant's arguments
concerning the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty
statutes, like the other claims raised in the petition for
writ of habeas corpus filed below, are precluded by the
1vaiver doctrine discussed supra in Point I.

That is,

these arguments could and should have been raised en direct
appeal.

Also, respondent submits that appellant has

failed to make an adequate showing to merit retroactive
application o£ the new cases upon which he relies.
Respondent's arguments on retroactivity are discussed
in Point III, supra.

However, should this Court desire

to review the merits of these claims, respondent maintains
that the issues are without legal merit.
Appellant raises three basic claims in attacking
the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty statutes.
First,

h~

claims that the sentencing portion of the trial

in a Utah capital case is deficient in the following
respects:

(a) no notice is given to a defendant of the

grounds (aggravating circumstances) upon which the death
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pC'nal ty is sought;

(b) the State is not required to

expressly plead or prove thC' grounds supporting the death
penalty;

(c) no factual findings stating the specific

considerations relied upon by the jury is required and
(d) appellate review is not adequate because of the
absence of factual findings.

Second, appellant argues,

based on Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), that
the death penalty may not be applied to appellant because
he was not specifically found to have personally taken life
or intended to take life.

Third, he argues that the method

of execution in Utah constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Respondent submits that the sentellc:"'
of Utah's death penalty statutes is sound.

\__ ,_:: 1_-tion

The claim of

lack of 11otice of the grounds upon which t_he State seeks
to rely in supporting the death penalty is rebutted by the
succinct clarity of Utah Code Ann.
amended.

§

76-5-202

(1953), as

This section lists the eight aggravating

circumstances for first degree murder, one or more of
which must be alleged, proved beyond a reasonable doubt
and found hy the trier of fact in a capital case.

Any

criminal defendant faced with a capital charge is put
on notice of these eight aggravating circumstances; if
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th. prosecution c{1nnot prove at least- on0 of th~~ eiqh~~,
a cko th sc:'ntpnce cannot be inrns<?c1.

The stiitutory

enuPteration of the2s<? factors allmnc; a rh'fenc!an t to
prepare a defense> on each of the <Jrounrls;

he is sufficiently

trier of fact 1'1\lst find in order to sup"ort a death
sentence.

u.s.
58 L.EcJ.

2<1 207

no not_ice 1.1as r:;i
upon by the

(1978),

in ,>l:ter'1ptin'] to shoH thJt

'o hil'1 of the src'cific gronnc1s relied

sente~cinCJ

authority. Thus, appellant argues,

he had no orpo•-r-uJJity to contest these' grounds.
and

Gardner

Presnell are easily distinguishable fran the instant

case.
In Garclnc:r, an individnal \-las convicted for
first degree rmrcler for the kill_in'] of his \-life in "a crine
of

'marital passion"'.

\Jhile the> jury considered

presentence report on the defendant.
a

recorm~cnc1a tion

juclqc-, relying

0n

of life impr isonmc'n t
i1

The triul

confidential section of the

pre sen Lcnce rcpor t v1h ich ''>'JS not rcV('il -1 r·cl to the
dcfcnc1anl nor inclwlccl as part of t!H· record on ,>ppcill,
ordcerccl that the· c1c·a lh pen a 1 ty be' i I'l!'CJ:;r'c1.
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Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing the
secret nature of the information relied upon by the
judge and stating:
[i]t is important that the
record on appeal disclose to the
reviewing court the considerations
which motivated the death sentence
in every case in which it is imposed.
Without full disclosure of the
basis for the death sentence, the
Florida capital-sentencing procedure
would be subject to the defects
which resulted in the holding of
unconstitutionality in Furman v.
Georgia.
430 U.S. at 361.
The facts of Gardner are markedly different than those
in the instant case.

Appellant here was not sentenced

on the basis of any "secret information"; as shown
from the discussion of

§

76 5-202, he was on adequate

notice of the grounds upon which the sentencing
authority would rely.

ApJ cllant had ample opportunity

to explain or deny any of thv aggravating circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution.

Most importantly, a

cornplete record was transmi Lted to this Court for review.
Aprellant state>s thilt

"Gani~~

stands for the proposition

that a system that permits l.he death sentence to be
imposed without giving open and specific and consistent
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reasons cannot be sustained."
29).

(Brie[ of 7\ppcllant aL

That propusition is not frustrated by the t:tah

system viliich, in the instant case, provided the
utah Supreme Court with a complete record on appeal
that included each and every basis for the
of the death penalty.
in the instant

c~sc;

i~position

No secret information

~as

present

full disclosure existed, thus

preserving the constitutionality o[ Utah's capital
sentencing phase.

inapposite.

In Presnell, Georgia statutes requin•d

that the prosecution prove under the facts of the case
murder COl'lii1ittc-i
kidnapping with
capital offense.

, de ensaged in the> coJYtmission of a
b~dily

injury in order to support a

The offenses of rape and sodomy had

also been committed by the defendant in addition to the
murder and kidnapping.

The key eler1ent in the pros<ecution's

case in support of the death penalty was a findin1 of
bodily injury in connection with the kidnapping charge.
Despite t~:~ fact that the jur~r hnd not explici_tly found

any bodily injury, the Georgia

Suprer1e Court affirr1ed

the death sentence, stating that evidence of Lodily
injury was clearly apparent

fro~

a review or the record.
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In reversing the sentence, the United Sta.tes Supre11e
Court found that the defendant had no notice whatsoever
of the grounds upon which the state was relying to
prove the requisite aggravating circumstance.

2d at 211, n.3.

58 L.Ed.

Thus, the defendant was denied any

opportunity to rebut the state's case before it was
submitted to the jury during the sentencing pha.se.
In the instant case, appellant was on notice
of the provisions of

§

76-5-202 before the case was

submitted to the jury during the sentencing phase.
Unlike

Presnel~,

the "fundar.1ental principles of

procedural fairness" were adhered to in appellant's
case.

The jury in the instant case had already found

at least one

a~gravating

circumstance proved

bc~ond

a reasonable doubt before the sentencing phase began.
Thus, appellant cannot complain that he wa.s denied the
chance to rebut the state's case against him in the
sentencing portion of the trial.

Neither the case

law nor the facts of the instant case suoports
a.:JCJella"t 's

co:~tc:ction

that he had no notice of the

grounds upon v1hicl1 the death penalty would be based.
Appellant also argues that the state was not
required to

ple~d

or prove any aggravating circumstances

beyond a rcasornJ,le doubt.

This argument is also

refuted by th<' fact thi1t the state had to prove at least
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-Gl-

clo•t!tl~

prove one agqravatin9 circumstance beyond a reasonablE'
at the guilt phase.

Contrary to appellant's

as~ertio~,

the (Jnitc'd State's Supreme Court hets nev<'r explicitly
requirPd tho prosecution to provide aggravating

circumstan~cs

at the sentencing phase in addition to those proved at tlw
guilt phase.

In Jurek v. Texas,

428 U.S.

262

(1976),

thr' Court

approved of a proc2Jure very similar to Utah's and statC'd:
l·ihile Te:<Js hil:3 nut adopted a
Jist of statutory aggravating
circumst'lnces the c::istence of lvhich
can justify the imposition of the
death penetlty as hetve Georgia and
Florida, its action in narrowinq the
Ciltegories of murders for which i1
deJth sentence mc;y ever be in·,posed
serves much the same purpose
In fact, each of the five classes of
murders made capital by the Texas
stutute is encompassed in Georgia
and Florida by one or more of their
statutory aggravating circumstances.
For Px~m9le, the Texas statutP
requires the jury at the guilt~
determining stage to consider whether
the cr imc was comrni t ted in the cour ~; e
of a particular felony, whethrcr it was
committed for hire, or whether the
defendant was an inmate of a penal
institution at the time of its
co~nmission.
t~e

Texas statute

'I'hus,

in c:>sscncc,

rcc:ui~~~

tho~

lhe

ju~~· fir1d the existo~ce o~ ~ sLatutot
a;"_;rava ting circumstance h--:·io.rc, the:
death penalty may be imposed.
428 U.S.

al 270.

Appellant's reliance on Garc1ner v.
as argucu

abo'.·~,;

Florirlc~

lS

lllisplaccd,

Gardner involvcc1 SC'cnct, un rcvczt 1 L'd
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inforrna ti,•n used

i~1

the S!:r,tenci nq phase which did not

,orm tlw Lasis for a sufficient record on appeal.
cas~

The

inst<:~nt

docs not strffer from the same procedural infirmities.
Appellant next argues that the absence of written factual

fiw'ings by the jury in the sentencing phase amounts to prejudicial
error.

This issue was, in fact, raised on appellant's direct appeal

and expressly rejected by this Court.

State v. Pierre, supra;

The issue was also

rai~cd

hy appellant

in hio; p"tition for certiorari l'lhich was also reJected by the
United States Supreme Court.
He~uirin0

The argument is also unpersuasive.

the state to prove at least one

aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt at
the guilt phase of the proceedings in Utah

minimize~

need for written findings of an aggravating eire

the

~-,

Indeed, such a requirement is nruch more favorablc to the
accused than Florida's systerf\vl: i ch merely requires the finclinrJ
o£ an

aggr~vating

circumstance at the sentencing hearing by

a majority vote ancl later gives the trial judge a virtual
Cndc~

written findings become

such a s;stt·

Moreover, under the Georgia capital sentencing
procedure, there is no reguirer·1c·nl that a record be kept of
the scntcncin') hcarLng.

Eatlw1, a·l1 the Georqia procedurc

p!·ovid<·s for is a tr<.mscript

of

th<' trial

(not the sentencing
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proceeding) and a six and one-half paqe questionnn,-, tr(e
completed by the trial judye which is
revie\viny court.

transmitl~ccl

In Utah, the transmission to

Lo the

th~

reviewing court of the entire transcript of the sentencing
proceeding provides far more information than docs a
six and one-half page questionnaire--such a transcript better
enables the revie1-1ing court to examine for itself whellter
the sentence of death is supJorted by the evidence and to
determine if

preju~icial

error occurred.

In short , th2

revie\vlng court ner'd not rely solely on the trizll_ jucLjl'' s
or jury's

charact~rization

of the sentencing proceeding.

Thus, Utah's appellate review procedure in which
the entire trial and sentencing transcript is reviewed to
determine if the ser1tence resulted from prejudice, arbitrary
action or caprice, better fulfills the constitutional concerns of
Greg~,~~ and ~roffitt v.

Fl~Fida,

428 U.S. 242

(1976).

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has statcrl that sn lnnn
as the record reveals the evidPntiarv basis for lhR imoosition
of the death penolty so as to ensure that the annPllnt:P r:ourt
may co:1c:uct o. COr:1!__)rehe!1si\~e re'Jie·...: of

the procc""_d l nr;s and

ensure that the penalty was not imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously, the concerns of Furman v. Georqia, 40R

(1972), are met.

_g_ardne_r__'0__ F_lor_ida_, ~~p~ at 361

u.s.

238

(1977)

The Supr<· ·'" Court mude it very cleo.r in ~~c~r'J:>
supr.-t, that vnitt<'n finc1inqs by the scnlcncing aulhority \vC're
not neccc>sa,:y for compliance with trw mdnclutc's or c·iiltcJ
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the Eighth oc Fourteenth Amendments.

Under the Texas

stat11tory scherc1e, all the jury is required to do is answe:c
~~yes·~

t~o

the follo\ving questions:

(l)
whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deJiberately
an~ with the recsonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or
another would result;
(2)
whether there is a probability that the defendant \'lOuld commit
criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing th~eat to
sociccty; und
(3)
if raised by the evidence,
whether the conduct of the defendant
in killing the deceased was unreasonable
in response to the provocation, if
any, by the deceased.
Tex. Co0c

Crim.

Proc., Act. 37.07J

(Supp. 1975-1976).

The Texas Criminal Code of Proculure c1oes not
require that the factors which were

consi~~re:

t,· the

jury .i.n d!lS\·Icr inC) the questions be 1'- r it ten ancl transmitted to
an app llate court for review of the sentence, nor does the
0

jury have to specify which aggravating circumstances they
found prec;"nt in the case.

jury.

Y<"L,

Furthermore, no statutory

tho Supreme Court held th;c,_t the Texas
Nor did

th0
of

~~xaR

statutory schene require Lhat the Texas Court

Cr.iiiiillil

illll"'llill.<'

1\pp,."als

conduct any pariirtllctr type of

rC'vic.:--oncl yet it was nol found to be con-

stiitlt
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·~evculccl

The record in thio; case

the

evid·~·u•~c

supporting the u.ggravettirY) ci_rcur,tsLm,;c·s chat·g,•cl and
disclosed that tlw evidt'nce presented in n•.itiqution of
the offense was virtually nonexiste11t.

Respondent submits

thGJ.t so long as the entire record of the proceeding is
such th.lt it discloses to the revie'.:incJ court thro eviden .,.,
which moti\'acc.ocl the death sentence in everi co.s00 in whic:h it
is imposed, such a record m0c;ts the rr·qu i r0men L:; of

c;_·,:.::c.'J•J ,

Jurek and Proffitt.
Some fi1:al comments on thee is:;uec of vnitten
findings must be made.

It is importnnt for this Court

to take note of what Gl.ppellant
on this paint.

He

d~es

Andr~ws

does not contend

not contend that he was sentenced

to death on the bu.sis of information which was not contu.incd
in the record of C>ither the trial or thC' sentencing proct.?ecling.
Nor does

he

contend that the record which was transmitted

to, and carefully reviewed by, the Utah Supreme Court did
not contain any evidence which

'.JiJ.c:

prc;scnted a l

the guilt or sentencing phases of

th~

Gu.nlner \'. "lor-ic1a,

360-JGl

430 U.S.

349,

The jury in the instu.nt

CdS~

bifucatcd pcocecdiny, cf.
(1917).

v1as not., ac;

argues, free to impose the deu.th pc·nalty for
outside tho~.;e recognized by lu\1"
21).

E'i ther

ilppellc1nt

"r0ason~;

\-!holly

(l'.ri,_-f of appellant at

This Court h<1s mandated that tl1c jury

!lllJ';\.

fincl

thdt

the aggravatinq filctors 0'.1tv1eiqh the mit ic;Jting factors,
Thus,

\ he•
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jucy' s finc1inqs are grounded in stututory fuctors, not
rcasun:-; outsid<-; thr; law.
Appellilnt's argument that appellate review is
fn1strJtul by the lack of \·Jr.itten findings ignores the
position tal:en by the United States Supreme Court in
In Gardner, the Supreme Court
stated that an adequate basis for appellate review exists
when the entire record of the trial is transmitted to
the

revie~ing

Court and the record contains the busis for

the findings at the triul level.
thcrrcfore,

sub11i ts

430

u.s. at 361.

Respondent,

that ap1x:llant' s claims of error

regarding the procedural aspects of the sentencing phase of
UtJh's death penalty procedure are without merit oc support.
Appellant next argues that relief should be granted
on the strength of Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S.Ct. 2954

(1978),

in which Justice White stated that "[i)t violates the
Eighth Amendment to impose the penalty of death without a
finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the
death of the victim."
not0 the-

:~cts

upQn

Id. at 2983.

~:hich

Justice

It is significant to

1~hite•s

statement is

bJsecl.
Sandril Lockett was sentenced to death as a
conscquc-•ncc of her participation as the "\vheelman" in a
roblJcry of a pa1vJ1shop that resulted in the murder of the
The evidence was in conflict as to lvhether
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Lockett even remaine'l in the
duriny the robbery

(it wa3

v~icinity

suguc~tcd

of the pa•.-m;lw;)
that she may I• .vc

left t11ce

;r~ca

that

actively partici;:,a tcc1 in the shoo tiny.

sJ. .o

to qo and cJt lunch clse1-.;her:-0), much less
This i':

in contrast to appellant's participation in the instant
case that v1as acti_ve throughout the course of the robbc_:ry
and multiple murders.

It mdy be

recC~lled

that ap!JE'lLll1t

was an active participant in the administration of the
liquid drain cl<'anc'r to the victirr:s.
The concurring opinion of

clust-~~icc

Blaci:I'nln is a

succ cnct rebuttal to appellanl' s att<:cl1i£)l to expand Justice
White's staterc1ent: far beyond its factuol conb:cxt.

Justice

Blackmun states:
I d0 not find entirely convincing
the disproportionality rule embraced
by my Brother W!IJTE.
The rule that
a defendant must hove had actual intent
to kill, in order to be capitally
sentenced, does not explain why such
intent is the sole crit~crion of
culpability for Eighth Amendment purpo:;ec;.
What if a dcf enclan t- personally comr:1i ts
the act proximately causing death by
pointing a loaded gun at the robbery
victim, verbally threatens to use
fatal fc-ce, adrittnJly does not intcnJ
to cause a death, yet knowingly crEate~
a hi']h c;~-ol:Jet':lili t\· thil t the crun '.:ill
discharge acciden~ally?
Wha~ if a
robber:y_ participant in orci~avoid
capture --Gr c·-"'cn-f or \-:~toto:, s por L,
E~ ~.~~_1.2_ -1 _-i-~f\--~-r1d-CT~::-flb:-~rr:l-L:: 1 y-li s c s

<] r ,l. ·,; ('

I?h;s ic- ~-- Eorce -~·_i_}}-;:-.:-c~ll_1 • ):C,-:Js in tenT-Eo
lnfll.cl serious !Jo·:i I·; ii.tlrn, but nul
to JZITI-;---;:;n([--il-cfr~., ti;-1~c~~:I1TCS?-!Ta
~ s j ud' J '" s ~~ ':_!Jl~ r<:,2:__1_::_ i_-'ll1_ tlt__.'\In c:~n_'1_r2_1_1 I~

vwe
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purpo~;cs

th" ct!JS'~nce of a "conscious
prnclucinq death," ante, at
:;2-iJ8"[Z_ t~a.\c;fonns the culpability of
th_c.:_~c (f~:r,-.-r~lunts' actions?
-!)urpoc~c-;--c)-(

AIJplyi WJ a requirement of actual
inU,nt to ki.ll to defendants not
immcdiat,_•ly involved in the physical
act causing ~cath, moreover, would
run aCjrOuJ~d on intricate definitional
problems attending a felony murd0r.
Whctt intention rnay a State attribute
to a rohlx:ry p::~rticipant \•Tho sits in ·the
ge>talvO'/ car, !:nm-;s that a loaded gun
will bP brandished by his companion
in the ro!Jbery inside the store, is
willing to have the gun fired iF
ncccssa1y to make an escape but not
to accomplish the robbery, when the
viet i r1 is shot: by the companion cvc:l
though not necessary for escape? \-iha.t
if the unarwcd participant stands
immcc1iatcly inside the store as a
lookout, intends that a loaded gun
merely be brandished, but never
bothc:rPcl to c1 isc".Jss witL the
t r.i ']gcnnan wha.t lirni ta tions v.~e~-e>
ap;>~ o;:1r [,, 1 c• for the firing of t'~:,
gun-.'
\·,'hdl. if the sillTle lookoc'::
pcrs0nRlly intended that the g.J~
novc1· be r i~recl, but, after his
comp~nion fires a fatal shot to
prc··.•con l t-lJ<e victim from sounding an
alarm, ilp[JnJVcs and takes off?
'1'ltc rcc;u i, Lment of actual intent to
kill in ocrJc, to inflict the death
penalty would require this Court to
i;··.nusc-' uoc.:-:: the States 2.n ??laborate
' 1 c:J:'"~-;t_i_ ~-~_ 1 ti-~_~c1iz::=~~~ defi21itio::1
of
t~c r0qtl is i ~l' r:ten~ re3., involving
m,.-,- i "'1 Pl obl em-s of line-drawing that
n~rmall~ are left to jury discretion
but tl1:tt, in rlisproportionality
anc1 1 ''"is, ll.~vc to be decided as issues
of L,l\i, and interfering with the subsL.lnti·v·• c,lt•·got~·[cs of the States'
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cl·im.1nill lull.
And such u rule,
even if wol-kable, is ~n inc·~mplelc
method of ascertaining culp3billty
for Eishtlt [,mendme:1t purposes, which
n·:-~ce.~_;etrily

is a more subtle mixture

of action, in0ction, and
mens rea.

dcgr~cs

of

98 S.Ct. 2969-70, n. 2.
In short, respon3ent contends that the instai1t cas2 is not,

as characterized by Justice Marshall, an imposition of a
"purely vlcarious theory of liubility."

98 S.Ct. at 2972.

A?pellant lias an active pilrticipant in the premeditated
series of r.1urdcrs that \"'ere

c);_-a'.·In

only be characterized as torture.
mere abettor in

2

out in a

fashior:. thal c,Jn

Sandra Lockett

w~s

i'1uJ·der reslllting from a punic]:cd

a

robb""~.

Moreover, the cc .. ~L~l focus of the Lockett Court is on the
failure of the Otio statute to permit a broad consideration
of numerous
phase.

t1gating circumstances at the sentencing

Justice \"ihi te' s statement is ancillary lo this

primary concern.

Since Utah is specifically distinguished

from Ohio by Justice Blackmun in note 3 at p.

2971,

appellant's arglLcent on this issue should be considered \·:i thout
fc:-ce.

still vital holding of the Supreme Court 1n Wilk~rson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879):
Cruel and unusual punishments arc
forbidden by the Constitution, but
the authorities referr0d to are
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quit0 sufficient to show that the
punishment of shooting as a means of
executing the death penalty for the
crime of murder in the first dearee
is not included in that categor;,
within th~ meaning of the eighth
amendment.
This language was also quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153,

178.

Appellant failed to provide, as required by

Rule GSR(i) (2), any support in his petition for his
argur~ent

t.hat execution by shooting does not corc.port

with ct.:rn'nt standurds of public decenc:{.

Respondent

standa"Cds of c1cccncy, as evidenced by the failure of the
legislature to change' the methods of execntion in this
State.

1\s stated in

~regg:

Therefore, in assessing a
punishment selected by a democrat'~a··
elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its
validity. We may not require the
legislature to select the least
severe penalty oossible so long as
the penalty selected is not cruelly
inhumane or disproportionate to the
crime involved.· And a heavy burden
rests on those who would attack the
judafllent of the representatives of
the ')PO£Jls.
This is true in 9art because the
constitutional test is intertwined
with an assessment of contemporary
standards and th0 legislative judgment
Wl·iqhs hea"ily in ascertainino su~h
standards. "rrJn a democratlC SOClety
lejislaturcs,not courts, are constituted
to resp(~nd to the will and consequently
tho noral values of the people."
Furman ~,eonJi::_, C'_~~· at 383
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(BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
The
deference we owe to the deci~~ic1:1s cf the
state legislatures under our feJcral
system, 408 U.S., at 46~-470 (REHNQUIST,
J., dissenting), is enhanc~J where
the spc~cification of punisr ncnts is
concerned for "these arc, peculi<-1xly
questions of lcyislative policy."
428

u.s.

at 175-76.
The lan9uage in Coke;- v. Gcorqia,

433 U.S. 584

(1977), cited by appellant concerning "barbaric'' and
"excessive" punishments is directed at the imposition of the,
death penalty for the crime of rape.

To attempt to stretch

this language to apply to the means used in imposincJ the'
sentence is to misapply the Court's reasoning and holding
in Coker.

Respondent contends that the death penalty

itself serves valid penal interests for certain classes
of murder and therefore meets the requirements of Coker.
To attempt to rebut the suggestion that the
only purpose served by shooting is the satisfaction of
doctrines of the Mormon Church would lend credence to
another unsupportable argument.
assertion is given and the

cl~i~

No basis for this bald
shoul6 be disnisseJ.

To conclude respondent's arguments on this
point, it is submitted that Utah's sentencing prOCl'(hn-c
is sound.

The mandates of the United States Supreme

Court were otservcd beth in statute and in practice_
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Lr:>ckc_::CI: _y_:__Q_l1io,
becau~;ce

( 1)

sup.ca,

is inapplicable in this case

appellant's acts •.vere markedly different than

defendant Lockett's and

(2) Utah's sentencing procedure is

expressly distinguished from Ohio's in respect to the
considcration of mitigating circumstances.

Finally,

execution by shooting remains constitutionally sound
and

Coke~c;e~_CL~_il._

is not offended because death

is a proportionate sentence for certain classes of
murder.

Appellant's claims of error should be dismissed.

-73-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V.
APPELL!I:'T' S CLl\Hl THAT 'riiE DEATH PENALTY [~;
BEING HlrOSPD IN UTAH l\ND TilE UNI'l'ED S'I'll'l'C:S
RARELY, ARBITRARILY AND DISCRIMINATORILY
\•lAS PROPERLY DISf•1ISSED BY JUDGE SA\•7l\Yl\ AS
A HATTER OF LA\'1.

Appellant's

amcn~eJ

petition for habeas corpus

relief aJvanced the theory that Utah imposes the Jeath
penalty "rarely and arbitrarily anJ discriminatorily
against the poor and outcast •:•hose alleged victi1ns are
"white

11

and whe:cf:: the cJo ~ r:_·ncia:: t is

and a stranger in the co!nmu'1i ty."
Petition at 8-9).

rr

non-\vh i Lo, rna l c,

p::>or,

(Appellant's AMended

He further alleged that the "p21ttern

and practice" or the prosecution of the death pen,1l ty in
Utah since the date of the re-enactment of the death
penalty shov1s that it is being appl iecl capricious J y.
Interestingly, appellant failed to attach to his

p~tition

any supporting factual data for these claims as r0<]Uirecl
by

Rule 65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of C.ivil Procedure, which

prLvidcs that a post-conviction complaint:
. shall
and

concis~

ter~~s

s~t

•orth in plain

the [actual

d21t2

constitutin<J each and every manner in
which the cornpluinant cL1ims thctl any
consti tulional riqhts \vCJ c• violil ted.
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'l'h<c ccw1plctint shall havce attached
thc'rclo 2ffidavito3,- copies of
records, or other evidence supporling
such allegations, or sho.ll state
why tl1e same are not a ttachecl."
(Emphil~;is added)
Also c;ee Point II,

supra.

Iloreover, at the hearing before Judge

Sawaya on respondent's motion to dismiss the amended petition,
appellant was given the opportunity to state what factual data
he was relying on in support of this claiQ and his counsel merely
respondccl with the conclusion that arbitrariness and capriciousness
in the Zt!•Plic0tion of the death penalty had occurred

(T.l2). 5

The district court rulecl on appellant's racial
prcjudic0 claim based upon two distinct theories.

First,

he concluded that:
. all issues raised in
petitioner's petition \verc knm·m
nr should have been known at the
time petitioner took his direct
ilp;x~al from his convict jon teo the
Utah Supreme Court, ilnci illl issues
either were raised or could have been
rdi ser·l on that i:tppeal, anc1 habeas
corpu:.; mily not be used .
. to
raise issues which could have been
raised on appeal.
Order of November 30, 1978 at l-2

5

(R.

119-120).

(Emphasis

Mr. Pi0rr~'s counsel merel) added the claim that
prosecuicn-s have in recenl c,>c;es impermissibly exercised
tllf'i r cl i <;cretion in chargin'T CZlpi tal offenses, an
i~'su<· Hilic:lt I<Jas raised to ar;c1 rejected by the United
Stales Supreme Court in Greyer_, Jurek and. Proffitt, and
the Fifth Circuit Couct of l\ppeals ln Splnkelllnk v.
Vl:rirr,:ric;hl, 578 F.2d 582 (l'J71i) ,::_<c_rt. ?cnied __ U.S.
--· (Ha1dl "1.6, 1':!79), as \r<ill Lc shO\vn infra (T.l6-l7).
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Second, he found that the allegation "fails to ;:t,<tc

i\

claim on which relief can Lc grantecl or on \,,hicll 0 hc:1rincr
nec'd be held

(Findings and Conclusions at 1;

R. 12<1) .
Judge Sa\;'aya was squctrcly \•lithin his pm·ilT in
ThR issue

so ruling with respect to the first theory.

of discr.imination and impermissible discretionary appl ic::>.t.ion
of the death penalty was raised by appellant in his direct
appeal of his conviction,

(J\ppellant Andcc·,·.'S'

I, which reasserted Point I

br i"'[, Point

(p. 7-18) of appellant Pierre's

brief in State v. Pierre, supra), and \vas pLc·Jiouc;ly
resolved by this Court in State v. Andrews,
709, 710

(Utah 1977), and State v. Pierre,

1338, 1345-1349 (Utah 1977).

574 P.2d
572 P.2d

Although the main focu•; of

appellant's argument on this issue during his direct
appeal was on the provisions of Utah's capital punishment
statutes on their face, nevertheless any claim of
discrimination in the way those statutes were

~l:'f2l~icd

in appellant's and Mr. Pierre's cases could likewise have

(Sec Points V and VI of Pierre's brief, pp.

32-<12, which

were reasserted by appellant Andrews).
that Mr. Andrews and Mr. Pierre wece the first to be
convicted unc1cc Utah's latest capital
provisions.

puqishn~L·:Il

Nevertheless, they lverc cet·t0.inly nc,l
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['reclude0 from raising claims of alleged arbitrariness
capriciousn2ss, or discrimination which may have actually
occurred during the course of their criminal proceedings.
Moreover, any studies, reports, statistical analyses,
theses, etc., which were available at the time of their
appeal to support their clairn of arbitrariness or capriciousness
in the imposition of the> death penalty could have been
append•d to their briefs on appeal for this Court's
consiueration,
208

u.s.

412

as per "Brandeis brief" in Muller v. Oregon,

(1908).

Thus, tlre reasoning expressed in Point I of this
brief,

supr~,

on the applicability and validity of the

waiver doctrine to this
respondent.

issue> is re-asserted by

The authorities outlined in Poi:1t I '''3iJ=

clear that Judge Sa1,1aya' s ruling was propeL
lai-J.

His finding that

~~

'L'o

,Jer of

issues, including the instant

one, either Here or could have been raised on direct
appeal Has proper.
Appellant attempts to circumvent the Haiver
doctri~e

by asserti~c th~t facts have developed since

he took his direct appeal which 1-JOuld shoi-J that the
c1cath penalty in Utah and the United States is being
applied in an arbitrJry, capricious and discriminatory
milnrH:c cle>spitc legislative efforts to draft capital
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punishment

statut~s

which preclude such

prublc~s.

Appellant's theory is that if he can show discriminatory
application of the death penalty occurring since his
conviction and appeal, he can then assert th3t death
penalty statutes, including Utah's, are

inadcquat~

and

unconstitutional, and have such a ruling apply retroactively
to him.

Appellant also asserts that he should ha•·e

been granted a hearinq to pr2scont evidcn'>.' in su;'''ort
of his claim.
Appellant's suggested approach is not novel
and was

expressly rejected by the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals in Spinkellink v.Wainwright, 578 r.2c1 582
(5th Cir. 1978), cc!_r_!_. dPniec1

U.S.

(;larch 26, 1979).

In Spinko_l}ink, the petitioner u. ttacked c'lor ida's
death penalty statute as applied conceding that the United
States Supreme Court hu.d already upheld the statute on
its face in Proff_itt :!· Florida, supra.

Specifically, he

alleged that the slu.tute was being applied arbittarily,
capriciously,

exccssJ~ely,

and disproportion3tcly in

that the statute 1·/as Lcin'J administered impermissibly and
discriminatorily by

pro~;rculors

in the pleJ !Jarcruinincr

process against defendants convicted of murdrring
as opposccl to bJ

ack~c,

etnd

agetin~ot

~hiles

mules und poo1: i"'t·snns.
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Id _ at ')')') _

Hr~

also cited to seven specific cases vlhere

thee Flor Lcl<t Supreme Court set aside dea·th sentences despite
the L1c L thdt they allegedly involved more heinous
circums '.cll•CCco than his case.

Id. at 602, footnote 25.

The Fifth Circuit wrestled with petitioner's suggestion that
the courtc; revic1:1 subsequent cases in search of evidence
of

ar~itrarincss

and capriciousness and rejected the

appro<lch based on the following rationale:
If this latter interpretation
is the correct reading of Proffitt,
s0rious problems arise.
First, e~ery
cr li,cinal defendant sentenced to
dc~th under Section 921.141 could through
fcrteral habeas corpus proceedings attack
the statute as applied by alleging
that other convicted murders, equally
or more deserving to die, had been
SDared, and thus that the death
p~nalty was being applied arbitra~J
and c0priciously, as evidenced b•
his own case.
The federal courts
then would be compelled continuously
to question every substantive decision 6f
t.llC' Florida criminal justice system
with regard to the imposition of the
death penalty. The intrusion would
not be limited to the Florida Supreme
Court.
It would be necessary also,
in order to review properly the Florida
~:>~:-)_cem_'.J

Cour~'

s decisio!1s, to rcvi2\'l

t~~· dstcr~i~ations of

t~2

trial cou~ts.

h~d

in order to review properly those
determinations, a careful examination
of every trial record would be in
orc1.:r. A thorough review \vould
nr,:os •; ita to looking boh ind the
c1urisions of jurors and crosecutors,

-79-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as well.
Additionally, unsuccessful
litigants could, before their
sentences were carried out, ch~llengc
their sentences aCJo.in o.nd again as
each later-convicted murderer was
givcon life imprisonment, because the
circumstances of each additional
defendant so sentenced would become
additional factors to be consider~d.
The process \·JOule! be neverending ar:·1
the benchmark for comparison would be
chronically undef incd.
Furtlle1·, thec·c
is no reason to believe that the
federal judiciary can render better
j uc; tice.
l\s the Florida Supreme
Court itself so candidly admits,
see Pro\rence v.

State,

supra,

3.37

so. 2cCat-78-~asonable persons
can differ over the fate of every
criminal defendant in every death
penalty case.
If the federal courts
retried again and again the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in each of these cases, we may at times
reach results different from those
reached in the Florida state courts,
but our conclusions would be no more,
nor no less, accurate.
Such is the human condition.
The Supreme Court in Proffitt
or in Furman, ~. Jurek~ lvoorlson,
or Robo~could not have intended
these results.
We understand these
decisions to hold that capital punishment
is not unconstitutional per se, and
t~at a state, if it chooses, can
ptJ:l.ish nr.J.rderers a.ncJ. seek to

its

prate;<:~

ci~izenr;

by iro9osing the duath
P~~alty - so long as it does so through
a statute with appropriate standards
to guide discretion.
If a staLe h~rc;
such a properly drawn statute--ani
there can be no doubt that Florida has-which the state follmvs in dcteuni ni rHJ
which convicted defendants receive
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the death pcnJlty and which receive
life imprisonment, then the arbitrariness
and capriciousness condemned in Furman
have been conclusively removed. For
us to read these cases otherwise would
thrust this Court and the district
courts into the substantive decision
making of the state court sentencing
process which is rightfully reserved
to the Florida state judiciary under
Section 921.141. Under the Constitution,
as well as fundamental notions of
federalism and comity, that is not the
role of the fed~ral courts. Cf. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746,
27 L.Ed. 2d 669 (1971).
A review of the record demonstrates
dramatically that the Florida state
trial court and the Florida Supreme
Court performed their unenviable duty
of sentencing Spenkelink (sic) under
Section 921.141 with care and
concern. Our inquiry must end there.
As for Spenkelink's contention that
this Court should go further, we thin~
the remarks of Justice White in l~lo:
concurring opinion in Gregg v. Geosupra, 428 U.S. at 226, 96 S.Ct. at
2949 (White, J., concurring), are
responsive:
Petitioner's argument that there
is an unconstitutional amount of
discretion in the system which
separates those suspects who receive
the death penalty from those who
receive life imprisonment a lesser
penalty or are acquitted or never
charged seems to be in final analysis
an indictment of our entire system of
justice. Petitioner has argued in
eff~ct that no matter how effective
the death penalty may be as a punishment,
govv,·nment, created and run as it must
be by humans, is inevitably incompetent
to administer it. This cannot be
accepted as a proposition of constit·,tional
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law.
Imposition of the death
penalty is surely an awesome
responsibility for any system of
justice and those who participate in
it. Mistakes will be made and
discrimin3tions will occur which
will be difficult to explain.
Ho·.:ever, one of society's most
b2~ic tasks is that of protecting
the lives of its citi~ens and one
of the most basic ways in which it
achieves the task is through criminal
la1·1s against murder.
I decline to
interfere with the manner in which
Georgia has chosen to enforce such
laws on what is simply an assertion
of lack of faith in the ability of
the system of justice to operate
in a fundamentally fair manner.
The
petitioner's contention is without
merit.
Id. at 604-606.
Thus, Judge Sawaya's rejection of this approach based
on either the waiver doctrine or on the merits was
certainly proper.
Secondly, as noted earlier, appellant Andrews
also claims that Judge Sawaya erred in not granting
him an evidentiary hearing to establish factually that the
death penalty is now being applied in a racially
discriminatory manner.

The Fifth Circuit Court in

Spinkellink also addressed this issue.

They noted that

Spinkellink had,in fact, received an evidentiary hParing
on this claim in the federal district court (he claimed
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on appeal that it

'tlilo;

irwcJequatc and desired a rern"lnd

to put on further evidence), hmvever, they held that
such a hearing was unnecessary because the issue could have
been dispc>sed of as a mo.tter of la'''·

The Court reasoned

as follow;;:
Assuming for the sake of
argument that the petitioner's
statistic;; arc accurate, his
contention must fail as a matter
of la~ on Loth of the constitutional
grounds relied upon.
The allegation
that Florida's death penalty is
being discriminatorily applied to
defendants who murder whites is
nothing more than an allegation that
the death penalty is being imposed
arbitrarily anJ capriciously, a
contention we previously have
considered and rejected. To allege
discriminatory application of the
death penalty, as meant in the
context of this case, is to 2r~~e
that defenc1ants who have murdered
whites ha~r received the death
penalty 1,1hen other defendants 1vho
have murd~red blacks, and who are
equally or more deserving to die,
have received life imprisonment.
In order to ascertain through
federal habeas corpus proceedings
if the dcalh penalty had been
discrimi~~torily imposed upon
a petitioner v~1ose murder victim
was whit0, a district court would
have to comp1rc the facts and
circumstances of the petitioner's
case would be [sic] (1,1ith) facts
ana circumstances of all other
Florida cl''Zlth r"'naJ ty cases involving
black vicLii'lS in order to determine if
the first degree murderers in those
cases were 0yually or more deserving to die.
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The petitioner thus reyucsts ~he
same type of case-by-c~se comparison
by the federal judiciury that 0e
have prcv ious ly re j ectcci in con:; i :1cr inq
the petitioner's contention th~l
Floridu's death prnalty is being
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously.
We need not repeat the myriad of
difficult problems, legal and
otherwise, generated by such federal
court intrusion into the substantive
decision making of the sentencing
process which is reserved tn the
Florida state courts under Section
921.141.
As we previously noted,
this Court reads Furman, Gregg,
Proffitt, Jurek, G0odson,-.:mciRoberts as-holdin:;J-tl-10.-tif a stLite
follows a properly drawn statute in
imposing the deuth penalty, then the
arbitrariness and capriciousness-and therefore the racial discrimination-condc~ned in Furman have been conclusively
rewo.·e I.
Floridal~as such a statute
and it is being followed.
The
petitioner's contention under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments is therefore
without merit.40
Footnote

40:
As we pointed out in footnote
28 supra with respect to the
contention that Fiorida's death
penalty is being imposed arbitrarily
and capriciously, this is not to say
that federal coilrts s:1oul~ ·.\:er
concern thc.-".selves on feJera l habeas

corpus review ',,~ith 1vhether Secc~ion
921.141 is being L!pplied in a
racially discriminatory fashion.
If a petitioner cun show some speci(ic
act or acts evidencing int<:'ntiona.l
or purpo~cful racial discrlmination
against him, see VillJCJE' of 1\rlinqlon
Heights v. Hetrop(,~-:::-ii~r1li~>~l~_i_n~--·---
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Developm~nt

Cnrp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68,
97 s.ct. 555, 56-4-65, so L.Ed. 2d 450
(1977), ei~her because of his own race
or the r~·
of his victim, the federal
district ~~~rt should intervene and
review substantively the sentencing
decision. We ~nphasize once again,
see note 28, supra, that this Court
anticipates that such intervention
will be infrequent and only for the
most compelling reasons. Mere conclusory allegations, as the petition
makes here, such as that the death
penalty is heine; "administerGd
arbitrarily and discriminatorily to
punish the killing of white persons
~s opposed to-~lack persons,"
Petitioner's Brief at~~ not
constitute such reasons and would
not warrant an evidentiary hearing.
This is so on eighth amendment grounds
as well as on fourteenth amendment
equal protection grounds, because
the intrusionary effect would be
the same.
Id. at 613-614.

(Emphasis added).

(For the Court's analyses of petitioner's Fourteenth
amendment approach to this issue, see 578 F.2d 614-616
wherein

it

concluded that for relief, petitioner would

have to allege and prove a deliberate, racially discriminatory intent or purpose by the state to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
Thus, Judge Sawaya properly ruled that this
issue failed to state a claim and did not require an
evidentiary hearing.
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Appellant's next claim is that becau;c of
prosecutorial discretion in charging ca]Jital felonies and
in the plea bargatning process, a pattern and practice
has emerged which shows a discriminatory, arbitrary
and

cap~icious

application of the death penalty.

This

claim also was properly disposed of by the lowec court
as a matter of law in that the United St3tes Supreme
Court has repeatedly dealt with the clai11 and rejected
it.
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The notion of prosecutorial discretion in charging
a capital felony was fully and repeatedly discussed in the
following cases:

Hr. Justice Stev;art' s opinion in Gregg at

page 199; !Vlr. Justice

l~hite's

opinion in Gregg at pages 224-225;

Hr. Justice Pm;ell's opinion in Proffitt at page 254; Hr. Justice
Stevens' opinion in Jurek at page 274; Mr. Justice Stewart in
\·Joodson

~~- Nor:_t_h__S_:':_!:"_?_:~ina,

42b U.S. at 284

Me. Justice White's dissent in Roberts v.
at 348-349

(1976).

(1976); and finally,
~ouisiana,

428

u.s.

The clear import of these discussions is

that such an element of discretion in the prosecution of cacital
cases is essential to the administration of the criminal justice
system.

Discretion at this slage does not rise to the

level of a constitutional defect in
regarding a capital felony.

The

~~e

state process

per:-':c5~'

latitude

given a state prosecutor is addressed by Mr. Justice
Stewart in Gregg:
First, the petitioner focuses on the
opportunities for discretionary action that
are inherent in the processing of any murder
case under Georgia law.
He notes that the
state pros~cutor has unfettered authority to
select-those persons whoo he wishes to
prn~ecute for a capital offense and to.plea
bargain with them. Further, at the tr1al the
jury may choose to convict a defendan~ of ~
lesser included offense rather than f1nd hlm
guilty of a crime punishable by dea~h, even
if the evidence would support a cap1tal
verdict.
l\nd finalJy, a defendant who is
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convicted and sentenced to Cl ic rtay have hi
sc;;i;encc' cOP1Pnd cc1 by lhec> Govccnor of the c;: te
and the C2org i ,·, fl•Jard of' Paulons il nd Pa cu J c·
The existence ·,li: t!1esc discretionary staqcs is
no·t dete.cninative of the i::;suc•.,; before" us.
l\t
e0ch of the:>c s~·a<Jcs 0n actc. - in the crir1in. l
justice sy~;· em I•t:J.kes o decit.ion which Play U"i<OVP
a clcr•,'ncluni fro:o1 consideration as a canclidat:r for
the death pPnalty. Furman, in contrast, c1e~lt with
the decision to irnpo.coc the dc>c<th sentence 0·1 a
snecific individual who h0d L~cn convicted o[ a
c~oital offense. Nothlnq in any of our co~cs
SligCJ ·~:: c; th:ct t,he c1ecic:icm to afford an iwl 'viclual
d·tcndan~ mcrcv violates the Constitution.
Furna~
held onlJ that,; in order to ninimizc the riskt!L,-;~
the death penalty coulcl be imposed on i1 cai,ri_ciously
selr·ctced group of of fenders, thE' clecic; i,on tCI irt['' •.;c
it hctd to be guider) by stancla1·ds so thc..t th • .sen "nclng
authority would focus on thee particulaci.ZE'cl circuc;stoilCe'
of the crime and the defendant.SO
SO.
The\ petitioner's arguf'lent is not·hincf mn:'c> tha;;
a veiled cont2ntion that Furman indirectly c·~tl~~a0
capital punishr1ent by placing totally unrca listie
conditions on its use.
In order to repair L~e alleged
defects pointed to by the petitioner, il would bn
nec<cssary to require that prosecuting authoriti0;
charge a capital offense whenever arguably the1·c had
been a capital murder and that they refuse to plea
bargain with the defendant.
If a jury refused to
convict even though the evidence support-ed the charges,
its verdict would have to he reversed and a verdict of
guilty entered or a new trial ordered, ~ince the
discretionary act of the jury nullification would not
be pernitted.
Finally, acts of executive clemency wou~
have to be prohibited.
Such a systeM, of course, I·!CJlild
be totally alien to our notions of crinti nal jus Lice.
I·1orc:::>v~!:",

it

\·Ioul~1.

Such a
\-lould hA.vc the v j ccs of t-h2
stat•Jtcs 1ve hold unconst~tutionc.
today in l_:'_o_oc1s_c,-,~n \". t\orth Ci'lrolinu, post,
u.:>. p.
96 S. Ct. D .-2iJ-7~-1;1(f[:c~>bC>rts v. Lou ~siana, rc.st,
___ u.s. p. __ , 96 s.c:. r-:- JOOl. Tlic--~:-u'JCJC·s-tC"jo that
a jury's verdict of ocq.JittCll could bP overturn(,,: ,t:H1 a
defccndrtnl: retried I!Oulcl run ·Foul of th(' Si):t!t 1\:•:··'l•l:~cn:
jury-trial guarantr'e und tit
Double ,Tcopanly Clause> of
the Fifth lm:cw}rnc,nL.
In the· federal sy~;l_em i t aJc;o
I·Jould be u::consl_itutional tr1 prohibit a Pr-c·siclcnl' froiTl
dccidinc;, c1s an act of C't-:c'c:•:c.ivc clemenc-y, to rc>prjovc
one sentE~nccc1 to death.
u.s. Consl., J\r·l. 1I, § 2.
systerr~. ir;.
manC.iltor~·

be unconstit11tir)n;1l.

ra:!~'

resr~cts
c'2ath pe:~·:tlt·r
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The opinions of the other Justices in the various cases
cited above echo the reasoning of Mr. Justice Stewart.
See also the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals legal analysis
of the issue in Soinkellink, supra, at 578 F.2d 582, 606-609.
While thB exact nature of appellant's claim of error
in his petition is not clear from the face of it, Gregg,
!'_r_o_ffitt, Jurek, \'loodson,
that an attack

o~

~oberts

and SpinkellinY:, indicate

the discretion of the prosecutor in

charging a capital felony is misdirected.

Judge Sawaya v:as

justified, therefore, according to the above cases, to
reject appellant's prosecutorial discretion claim as a
matter of law since it is an improper basis upon which to
g,-ant appellant relief.

The Supreme Court is clear in

ils holding that discretion during the prosecution stetge of
a criminal proceeding is proper and cannot be considered as
a factor in the arbitrary appljcation argument in capital
casccs.

The balancing approach taken by the Supreme Court

in this area deJT\onstrates its unwillingness to delve into
th0 coJT\plex

decisio~

process of prosecutors and therefore

determined that such review is improper.

Such a ruling is

sounc1 and respondent urges this Court to adopt this position.
Finally, respondent submits that the cases above
c1jscussed--Gre'}9_, Jurek, Proffitl, etc.--have provided
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state courts v1ith sufficient guidelines for
urbitrarin<'~

. onJ

discrii~tinat:ion

tes t.i ncJ

in death penall.y

foJ-

Ci:l:;cc;

sc>

as to make rulings on this issue as a matter of luw possible.
Moreover,

it was not

Supreme Court,
conviction

nc~essary

·Ln these cilses,

evicl·~ntiary

for the United Stutes
t.o have f urthcr

pc):; t--

hcarinc)s in order to reach

decisions on tll,sc legal questions.

rrhe Cou.ct' :; dc:r_;_i_sions

1vere basec1 solely upon rcvie':l of ·the trial court onJ s '"' le
appellate court records.
this Court and the l01·1er coucl may proporl:' rcl;' onc1 accept
prior rulings or1 those is sups as au t.hori ty for
the moLter.

nc~;olution

of

1s no neac1 to relitigate the same claims.

In any evenL, responc1ent contends that i1ppell<m t' s
claims are most speculative.

For example,

in his brief,

appellant contends that Judge Sawaya deniej hirn a chance to
advance his evidentiary and authoritative theories o[
arbitrariness.

He claims the conrt "hE"ard neit Iter this

evidence nor legal argu~wnt fror•1 the petitioner,"
bric~

at 25).

(app:'llant~s

This sinply is not tru0.

Appellant was given the opportunity to st0tc: to
the lower courl what his claims of arbitrarines~ consi•.l·p~
of

(Tr.l0-11).

InsL~ad,

appellant's counsel merely statec1

that "we would hope to have an ezpecLi tions hear i It'J

j 11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-CJ(lLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\·lllich

1112

can establish thut claim in

Utah Courts."

(Tr.l3).

Respondent contends, therefore, that inasmuch as
concreto, specific claims of arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty were not made readily
apparent to the lower court, Judge Sawaya was justified
in ruling, as a matter of law, that the claims lacked
sufficient merit.

Clearly, Judge Sawaya could do so since

appellant's claim was soon to be most speculative.

Appel-

lant should not he permitted to raise issues if he has
insufficient facts upon which to base his

cla~~s

and does

so only in an effort to be granted an additional forum "in
which [appellant] can establish that claim.

Respondent

suggests that such claims are only attempts by appellant to
delay and

thwart

his heretofor affirmed sentence.

Finally, appellant contends throughout his brief that
Judg9 Sawaya granted respondent's motion to dismiss without
sufficient legal authority or basis.

Yet, respondent referred

Judge Sawaya to the legal arguments contained in the State's
brief in opposition to certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court and the respondent's brief filed with this
court in appellant's direct appeal following his
(Tr.25,?G).

co~viction

Respondent's motion to dismiss, his

supporting memo:anda and the attached above mentioned
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briefs were all

befor~

Judge Sawaya.

justified in ruling on the merits as a matter of la~
and granting respondent's motion to dismiss.
Respondent urges thi,: Court to find that
appellant's clain or racial discriP:in0tion :in t;Jc,
application of this .';tatc='s death penalty is foceclo;"
by thEe Uni_ ted States Supreme Court '.ccisions,

~'j~_C\r

and Spinkellink, supra, and is thccefore without

r'lc'CL'::.

Responden·t further urges this Court to n!lc that
Judge Sawaya was therefore justified in granting
respondent's motion to dismiss as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, respondent submits

th~t

Judge Sawaya's order grantiny respondent's motion to disniss
and denying appellant a stay of execution was sound based
upon the application of this Court's waiver cloct•:i1v

that

issues which were or could have been raised on direct
appeal may not subsc=quently be raised in a post-convlction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, appellu.nt failed to raise any clcti"1 upo:1
which relief could be gru.nted clue to the Vilguc and "Jl"culoh~

tive nature of the claims, and the added fact that
not benefit frorn a retJ oJctive> appJ ication of the
case law he relic,d

UflO'l

JW\·7

in support of his pr;tition.
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na}·

Fin~llj,

this Court should

rulin'] inz:tsm'.'''h as the Uti\ll

de,:~th

affir~

the lower court's

penalty statutes remain

conc;titutionally sound in light of recent United States
Supremo Court

d~cisions,

and should uphold the dismissal

of appellant's claim of arbitrary and capricious application
of the- death penalty inasmuch as it lacks legal merit.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DOIUUS
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT R. \Il\LLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorn~:'s

fo·:- Respondent
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